Essays in applied microeconomic  theory by Xu, Xun
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2020





GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Dissertation




B.A., Sun Yat-Sen University, 2011
M.A., Brandeis University, 2013
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 





      XUN XU
      All rights reserved except for chapter 1, 




Assistant Professor of Economics
Second Reader




Associate Professor of Economics
Acknowledgments
I thank my dissertation committee - Chiara Margaria, Albert Ma, and Jawwad Noor-
for their guidance. I am also grateful for my coauthors - Davide Proserpio, Georgios
Zervas, and Keith Hylton - for their work. Last but not least, I thank many other
faculty members and my Ph.D. colleagues at BU for their insightful comments and
productive conversations.
iv
ESSAYS IN APPLIED MICROECONOMIC THEORY
xxx
XUN XU
Boston University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2020
Major Professor: Chiara Margaria, Assistant Professor of Economics
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays in applied microeconomic theory. The
first chapter, “You Get What You Give: Theory and Evidence of Reciprocity in the
Sharing Economy”, co-authored with Davide Proserpio and Georgios Zervas, develops
an analytical framework to study reciprocity. A seller is said to be reciprocal if he
increases his effort in response to an increase in the buyer’s effort. Our model predicts
that sellers who are more reciprocal can charge higher prices. Data from Airbnb
confirms this prediction.
The second chapter, “Error Costs, Ratio Tests, and Patent Antitrust Law ”, co-
authored with Keith N. Hylton, examines the welfare tradeoff between patent and
antitrust law. Patent laws encourage innovations by granting firms legal monopoly
power, whereas antitrust laws limit it. We construct an index to quantify the conflict
between partent and antitrust laws. This index is the error cost ratio, which is the
social welfare under the monopoly divided by the deadweight loss. For a wide range
of common demand functions, this error cost ratio ranges from about three to infinity.
v
It suggests that the typical welfare under monopoly is usually much larger than the
deadweight loss. Hence, antitrust should be more tolerant.
The third chapter, “Optimal Contracts with Personal Agenda”, studies dynamic
contracting problems between a principal and an agent. In each of the two peri-
ods, the agent chooses a project among three. The agent’s personal agenda conflicts
with the principal’s objective. The optimal contract attenuates the incentive con-
flict while limiting the agent’s ability to build project experience. I show that the
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Chapter 1
You Get What You Give: Theory and Evidence of Reciprocity in the
Sharing Economy
Coauthored with Davide Proserpio and Georgios Zervas
1.1 Introduction
Over the past few years, we have witnessed the rapid growth of peer-to-peer market-
places like Airbnb (accommodation), Uber (transportation), and TaskRabbit (chores
and errands). Compared to traditional marketplaces for similar services, peer-to-peer
markets have two distinguishing features. First, service quality is heterogeneous and
can vary significantly both between suppliers and from one occasion to the next. Sec-
ond, transactions in peer-to-peer markets entail the close interaction of individual
buyers and sellers.
In this paper, we study these peer interaction patterns, focusing in particular on
reciprocity: a social norm under which people respond to others’ actions with an
equivalent action. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence that reciprocity
regulates the behavior of peer-to-peer market participants thus affecting both service
quality and market outcomes. In doing so, we provide an interesting connection
between peer-to-peer marketplaces and behavioral economics. Our model is also the
first, to the best of our knowledge, to apply interdependent preferences to study peer
interactions in the sharing economy, and to show that this interdependence is more
salient in these new marketplaces when compared to traditional marketplaces for
similar services.
Before proceeding, we note the term reciprocity has been used to refer to two
different concepts in two main strands of literature that we build upon: the liter-
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ature on online reviews and reputation, and the behavioral economics literature on
trust, fairness, and cooperation. In the online reputation literature, reciprocity refers
to strategic reviewing behavior where positive (negative) feedback from one party is
likely to be “reciprocated” with positive (negative) feedback from the other party (Del-
larocas and Wood 2008; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002). In the behavioral economics
literature, reciprocity refers to the tendency of market participants to respond to good
(bad) behavior with good (bad) behavior (Sobel 2005). We use the term reciprocity
in the behavioral economics sense.
The sharing economy is a natural setting for reciprocity to arise. Take for in-
stance Airbnb, an online marketplace for short-term accommodation rentals that has
emerged as an alternative to hotels (Zervas et al. 2017; Farronato and Fradkin 2018).
According to Airbnb, most hosts rent the place they live in, and are likely to closely
interact with their guests. Some Airbnb hosts provide home cooked meals, take
their guests on neighborhood tours, or pick their guests up from the airport. Airbnb
guests can reward exceptional hospitality by keeping the place clean, being respectful
of neighbors, or leaving small gifts for their hosts. Airbnb user testimonials suggest
that this type of behavior is both common and greatly valued by guests and hosts
alike.
We formalize this intuition by developing an analytical framework of user interac-
tion in the sharing economy. Taking Airbnb as our use case, we model the quality of
each Airbnb stay as a function of the joint effort of hosts and guests. In deciding how
much effort to exert during each stay, hosts and guests take into account each others’
reciprocity preferences. These preferences can vary. For example, some hosts will re-
spond to a small gift by taking better care of their guests, while others won’t. Airbnb
guests can induce reciprocal hosts to exert more effort by behaving better themselves.
Reciprocal hosts respond to increased guest effort by increasing their own effort levels
and, as a result, earn higher ratings from their guests. Therefore, in our model hosts
who are more reciprocal have higher ratings. In turn, higher ratings lead to increases
in demand and, consequently, more reciprocal hosts can charge higher prices. Thus,
our model predicts that reciprocity influences prices through its effect on ratings.
After presenting our theoretical framework, we use data from Airbnb to test the
predictions of our model. First we show that reciprocity and ratings are positively
correlated. To do so, we begin by identifying Airbnb hosts who are likely to be
reciprocal, i.e., hosts who value their guests’ behavior. Because we cannot directly
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measure reciprocity, we rely on proxies. Our preferred proxy is the length of the
reviews hosts leave for their guests. Unlike listing reviews, which usually describe
both the host and her property, the reviews hosts leave for their guests focus on
the person being accommodated. We hypothesize that hosts who take the time to
write detailed reviews about their guests, are more likely to care about their guests’
conduct, and, therefore, to value reciprocity more. As hypothesized, we find that
hosts who write longer guest reviews have higher ratings. This result is robust to
alternative proxies for reciprocity, which we discuss in detail in Section 1.5.
Our model is also able to explain a novel pattern we identify in the Airbnb data
that is not easily explained under alternative plausible models of user behavior. We
show that Airbnb hosts who list their properties for rent on Airbnb frequently (whom,
for simplicity, we will refer to as professional hosts) have lower ratings than those with
less frequent market participation (whom we will refer to as casual hosts). Moreover,
this relationship is independent of the degree of social interaction between guests and
hosts, and thus unlikely to be the effect of social bias arising from the face-to-face
interaction between hosts and guests (Fradkin et al. 2017). Taken together these two
observations suggest that casual hosts offer higher levels of quality than professional
hosts. To explain this finding, we show that there is a negative association between
reciprocity are market participation. Thus, we argue that the higher ratings of casual
hosts can, at least in part, be explained by their increased preference for reciprocity.
We conclude our analysis by showing that reciprocity has important implications
for market equilibrium. Our model predicts that reciprocity affects ratings which in
turn affect prices. We test the prediction that Airbnb listing prices respond positively
to ratings by exploiting a unique feature of the Airbnb reputation system: Airbnb
discloses a host’s average rating only after the host collects three reviews. We argue
that the timing of these rating disclosures is exogenous and show that listing prices
respond positively to the disclosure of high ratings, even after controlling for changes
in listing quality. Taken together, our results suggest that reciprocity can explain the
higher ratings, and thus higher prices, of casual hosts.
Besides demonstrating the impact of reciprocity on market equilibrium and prices,
our work contributes to a more comprehensive understanding on how trust is gener-
ated in peer-to-peer markets (Tadelis 2016; Einav et al. 2016). Reciprocity in the
sharing economy can act as a social norm (Gouldner 1960), generating trust between
market participants (Malmendier et al. 2014). When two agents trade, one agent’s
3
poor conduct can trigger negative reciprocity and the agent is punished by the other
party. Similarly, an agent’s good conduct triggers positive reciprocity and the agent
is rewarded by the other party. Thus, agents may choose to behave well both to
motivate good conduct from the other party, and to avoid the threat of negative
reciprocity. Through this mechanism, reciprocity can regulate behavior and generate
trust among users.
1.2 Related literature
Next, we discuss two relevant strands of literature, on reciprocity and reputation, and
highlight connections to our work.
Our work studies the role of reciprocity in promoting improved behavior and co-
operation in peer-to-peer platforms. The definition of reciprocity that we adopt in
this paper is similar to that of Sobel (2005) , who defines reciprocity as “a tendency to
respond to perceived kindness with kindness and perceived meanness with meanness
and to expect this behavior from others”. A large body of research finds that reci-
procity is a important determinant of behavior (see, for example, Kahneman et al.
(1986) and Fehr and Gachter (2000)). Fehr and Gachter (2000) survey applications
of reciprocity in several areas of economics, emphasizing the role of reciprocity in
encouraging collective action. In our setting, we investigate how hosts and guest act
collectively to improve their joint experience.
Rabin (1993) was the first to propose intention-based reciprocity, the tendency of
players to reward good intentions and punish bad intentions. Falk and Fischbacher
(2006) investigate the role of intentions in driving reciprocity whereby actions with
identical consequences can result in different reciprocal responses depending on how
“fair” these action are perceived to be. Malmendier et al. (2014) discuss recent
theoretical and experimental developments in reciprocity research, arguing that “reci-
procity is internal in that it arises from an individual’s preference to act in a way that
rewards good behavior by others”. Our concept of shared experience utility builds on
these insights, by enabling marketplace participants to rewards or punish each others’
behavior.
Finally, Rotemberg (2006) survey economic models of reciprocity in the context of
organizational economics, distinguishing reciprocity from other types of social pref-
erence, such as altruism. We also consider altruism as a possible way to explain our
4
findings, but argue that reciprocity is better suited to explaining the patterns in our
data.
Our work also relates to a large marketing literature on reputation, feedback
systems, and rating biases in online markets. A number of papers have studied
the effects of seller reputation across different settings. For example,Luca (2016)
and Anderson and Magruder (2012) show that Yelp ratings affect restaurant revenue
and the likelihood of being sold out, and Yoganarasimhan (2013) shows that better
rated freelancers in an online labor market are more likely to be chosen by buyers
and can charge higher prices. Our theoretical model makes similar predictions to
Yoganarasimhan (2013), and we find similar patterns in the Airbnb data: hosts with
higher ratings tend to charge higher prices.
Closely related to our setting, a number of papers have studied bilateral reputa-
tion systems. Early studies focused on eBay, one of the first platforms introducing a
bilateral reputation mechanism, in which buyers and sellers review each other after
a transaction. Among others, Dellarocas and Wood (2008) and Resnick and Zeck-
hauser (2002) show that ratings on eBay are extremely positive, and that there is
substantial amount of feedback reciprocation – a practice in which the receipt of a
positive (negative) feedback from a transaction party increases the likelihood of the
other party to also report a positive (negative) feedback. More recently Fradkin et
al. (2017) studied the bilateral reputation system of Airbnb, and reported similar
reporting bias. Fradkin et al. (2017) argue that the bias in this case is generated
by socially induced reciprocity whereby users tend to under-report negative feedback
following an in-person interaction with the other party. Horton (2015) also study
reputation inflation in online markets, and show that negative ratings are more likely
to be under-reported when they are public.
For an extensive review of the literature on reputation and feedback systems on
online platforms, we refer the reader to Tadelis (2016), Edelman (2017), and Seiler et
al. (2018).
1.3 Theoretical framework
In this section we introduce our theoretical framework. Below, we describe the model
in the setting of Airbnb, but the model can be applied in other sharing economy
platforms, such as Taskrabbit or Upwork.
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1.3.1 Setup
Since our main focus is the reciprocity between hosts and guests, we assume a mo-
nopolistic host, a continuum of guests, and we do not consider competition in our
analysis. Prices are posted by the host, which matches the price-posting feature on
Airbnb.
Our baseline model has three periods:
1. In period 1, the host chooses price P1 for her listing, and every customer decides
whether to enter the market, i.e., pay the host to book the accommodation.
2. Period 2 is the time of the accommodation stay, thus, in period 2, the host and
the guest i each determines the effort level to exert during the stay. Then, each
guest i who stays at the host’s property publishes a rating rh,i, and the host
publishes a rating ri towards the guest i.
3. In period 3, another unit mass of guests enter the market. The host and period
3 guests observe the first period demand and the average rating disclosed at
Period 1. The host chooses price P2 for her listing, and the customers decide
whether to enter the market according to the disclosed rating and the prices.
We solve the equilibrium by backward induction from period 2 to period 1. Since
the subgame in period 2 is the main focus of our analysis, we introduce the setup of
period 2 first.
Period 2: Accommodation.
In period 2, guest i and host h both choose their effort levels by maximizing their
respective ex-post utilities:
Ui(ei|eh,i, ri) = vh + αiu(ei, eh,i)− C(ei) + βiri (1.1)
Uh(eh,i|ei, rh,i) = vi + αhu(ei, eh,i)− C(eh,i) + βhrh,i, (1.2)
Both utility functions are composed of three parts. The first part, vj+αju(ei, eh,i),
is the utility obtained from the accommodation stay; the second part, C(ej), is the
effort cost, and the third part, rj, is the utility obtained from the ratings and reviews.
While all the alternative models discussed in Section 1.6 have these three components,
6
our model innovates in the term, vj +αju(ei, eh,i). The term u(ei, eh,i) represents the
mutual experience utility ; the parameter αj denotes the weight of the agent j on the
mutual experience, and βj denotes the weight of the reputation utility with respect
to Uj, i.e., how much agent j cares about the ratings and reviews she receives.
In the following analysis, we assume (αj, βj) ≡ αj ∈ [ᾱmin, ᾱmax]. The vector αj
is the private information of agent j, while its distribution on [ᾱmin, ᾱmax] is common
knowledge. The variable vh in equation 1.1 is assumed to be fixed and exogenously
given, and denotes some objective factors of the host affecting the welfare of the guest,
such as the location of the listing property. We assume vh follows uniform distribution
on [0, v̄h]. Similarly, vi in equation 1.2 refers to some factors of the guest i that affect
the host’s utility, and that are not endogenously determined by the guest’ effort. An
example of vi is the number of persons hosted, or whether the guest has a kid or
a pet. vi follows uniform distribution on [0, v̄g]. Note that the terms vh and vi are
introduced to match the realistic scenario on Airbnb, but all of our analytical results
are robust to the presence of vi and vh.
u(ei, eh,i) introduced in the ex-post utility of the guest i and the host is what we
call mutual experience utility. It represents the quality of the accommodation which
affects the welfare of both the host and the guest, and it is determined by the efforts
of the host, denoted as eh,i, and the effort of the guest, denoted as ei. Examples of
eh,i on Airbnb include a smooth check-in/check-out, reserving a cab for the guest, or
suggestions about the restaurants in the neighborhood. Similarly, an example of ei is
the guest effort to clean after herself, or to follow the house rules.








which state that u(ei, eh,i) increases with the increase of both ei and eh,i. Further, we





This condition states that a higher effort exerted by the host increases the marginal
utility of the well-behaved guest, i.e.,










, given the same level of ei.
This assumption is as with the intrinsic reciprocity models, such as the intention-
based reciprocity (Rabin 1993), and shows that an agent is more willing to behave
well to those agents that behave well back.
Finally, we adopt the standard assumption that agents report their utility of the
accommodation experience in the online ratings (to which we refer as the truth-telling
assumption in our analysis), i.e.,
ri = vi + αiu(ei, eh,i) (1.6)
rh,i = vh + αhu(ei, eh,i) (1.7)
In Section 1.3.3, we show that our model is robust to the relaxation of such assump-
tion.
Period 1: Pre-accommodation.
In Period 1, the host posts the price P1, and the guests decide whether to request
accommodation. The transaction volume Q1 is determined at this stage. The utility
of the host is composed by two parts: the monetary revenue, P1Q1, and the expected
utility in period 2. The utility of the host in period 1 is given by:





h,i, ei, vi, rh,i)]di, (1.8)
where Uh(e∗h,i, ei, vi, rh,i) is the ex-post utility host obtains during the period 2. e∗h,i is
the optimal effort the host exerts during the transaction with guest i, and ei is the
equilibrium effort exerted by guest i.
In period 1, the guests choose whether to make a booking request based on their




i , eh,i, vh, ri)|P1]− P1, (1.9)
where Ui(e∗i , eh,i, vh, ri) is the ex-post utility of period 2. As before, the ex-post utility
depends on e∗i , the optimal effort exerted by guest i, and eh,i, the equilibrium effort
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level exerted by the host in the transaction with guest i.
1.3.2 Propositions
To simplify the mathematical proofs, we assume that the mutual experience utility
takes the Cobb-Douglas functional form in the following analysis, i.e.,




h,i , k ∈ (0, 1). (1.10)
However, our model predictions suffice in any non-separable form of u(ei, eh,i) satis-










In the analysis below, we also adopt the widely-used quadratic functional form for




We solve the period-1 equilibrium by backward induction. In Period 2, the host
and the guests choose their effort levels. At this stage, the uncertainty on α is resolved,










{vi + αhu(ei, eh,i)− C(eh,i) + βhrh,i} (1.13)




)k−1 − cie∗i = 0 (1.14)
(1− k)(αh + βhβi)(
e∗i
e∗h,i
)k − che∗h,i = 0 (1.15)
By the optimality conditions, we obtain the following solutions for e∗i and e∗h,i:
e∗i = A(αh + βhαi)
γ(αi + βiαh)
1−γ (1.16)
e∗h,i = B(αh + βhαi)
µ(αi + βiαh)
1−µ, (1.17)
where γ ≡ 1−k
2
and µ ≡ 1− k
2










Then we have following propositions:
Proposition 1.1 The host’s average rating on Airbnb is positively related to her 









is the average rating of the host.
Proposition 1.1 states that, given that the agents report their utility in the feed-
back, the average rating of a host reflects her characteristics. Intuitively, a host with
higher weight on mutual experience is, on average, more willing to help her guests.
Then, by reciprocity, the guests are willing to exert more efforts towards the host.
In turn, the higher effort level exerted by both sides lead to a higher level of mutual
experience utility, and therefore a higher average rating of the host. Formally, from







The above equations show that the equilibrium effort levels of the host and the guest
increase with the host’s weight on mutual experience. In turn, as stated before, these
efforts increase the mutual experience utility u(ei, eh,i). Finally, the higher levels of
u(ei, eh,i) is reflected in the higher rating left by the guest i to the host, which leads
to the higher average rating for the host.
Claim 1.1 The results above show that ratings are informative about the character-
istics of the host. Based on this, we propose the following claim:The hosts with higher
weight on the mutual experience utility have higher average rating.
In the next proposition, we show that the bilateral rating system adopted by
Airbnb reveals the hosts’ hospitality characteristics better than the unilateral rating
system where the host does not rate the guest, i.e., ri = 0.
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Proposition 1.2 The ratings on both review systems depend positively on the weight
of reciprocity and reputation, αh and βh. However, the seller’s average rating on
Airbnb responds more to the weight on mutual experience utility, and the seller’s

















rairh,i (eh,i, ei)di is the seller’s average rating on Airbnb, and Runi ≡∫
i
runih,i (eh,i, ei)di is the seller’s average rating on an unilateral rating system.
A continuation, we provide an intuitive explanation of the proposition. The first




> 0, states that the average rating of the
host on Airbnb and on the unilateral system platform are both positively determined
by the host’s weight on mutual experience utility. Moreover, the rating on Airbnb
is more responsive to the host’s weight on mutual experience utility than that on
unilateral system.
The positive relationship between the mutual experience weight and the bilateral
rating is established in Proposition 1.2. Thus, in following analysis, we just briefly
explain why this positive relation also exists under the unilateral system. From the
proceeding analysis, we know that, independently of the design of rating systems, the
effort exerted by the host is positively determined by the host weight on the mutual
experience, and that such effort determines the effort level of the reciprocal guests.





> 0. As the efforts positively determine the mutual experience utility, the
higher weight on the mutual experience creates higher mutual experience utility, which
is revealed in the higher average rating of the host, i.e., ∂Runi
∂αh
> 0.
To show that ratings in the bilateral system are more sensitive to the mutual
experience weight than those in the the unilateral rating, we demonstrate that for the
same host, αh has larger effect on ratings in the bilateral system than in the unilateral
system.
We start by showing that for the same pair of host and guest i, the guest i exerts
less efforts under the unilateral system. Since in the bilateral system the host rates
the guest i, the guests have reputation concerns (recall the in the bilateral utility of
the guest there is a reputation utility part). Therefore, under bilateral system the
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guest i exerts more effort then under unilateral system. Moreover, since the guest’s
efforts and the host’s hospitality characteristics determine the host efforts, the host
will exert more effort under the bilateral system. Moreover, the difference between
the host’s efforts in the two systems translates into a higher mutual experience utility
under the bilateral system, and therefore higher ratings.
Now let’s extend the analysis to two hosts dealing with the same guest. Following
the above analysis, both hosts exert more efforts on bilateral system. Moreover, the
host with higher weight on mutual experience utility has larger increase of the efforts
with respect to the unilateral system, i.e. their rating difference will be higher on the
bilateral system than on the unilateral.




























Where equation 1.24 is the derivative of guest optimal utility with regard to the
host’ mutual experience weight and is a special case of 1.23 when ri = 0. Since βi > 0,
the ∂Ui(ei)
∂αh
on the bilateral system is larger than ∂Ui(ei)
∂αh
on the unilateral system. The
larger ∂Ui(ei)
∂αh
on bilateral system translate into a larger rh,i
αh
in equilibrium.
Let’s illustrate this with an example: assume two hosts, Abby and Bob, each
endows with αeA and αeB, and αeA > αeB. From the positive
∂Ui(ei)
∂αh
, we know that the
Ui of the same guest i is higher when she stays with Abby than with Bob. Thus,
the same guest i exerts more effort to Abby than Bob. Also, due to the larger ∂Ui(ei)
∂αh
on the bilateral system, the difference between ei(stay with A) and ei(stay with B) is
larger on bilateral system. The larger difference of i’s efforts then translate into larger
difference between mutual experience utility reflected in ratings. By this mechanism,
the rh,i responds more to the αh on bilateral system than on the unilateral rating
platform. The detailed proof of Proposition 1.2 is in the Appendix A.
With the above proposition that the two platforms respond differently to the two-
dimension characteristics of the host, (αh, βh), we conjecture that the ranking of the
same set of hosts is different on the bilateral and the unilateral system. The ranking
on the bilateral system reflects more of the hospitality of the host, while the ranking
on the unilateral system is more responsive to the host’s weight on reputation. Based
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on this conjecture and the Proposition 1.2, we establish the following claim:
Claim 1.2 For a given set of hosts, the one with higher αh and lower βh is ranked
higher on Airbnb than her counterpart with lower αh and higher βh, while the opposite
is true for on the unilateral rating system.
The final proposition of our baseline model establishes the positive relationship
between the price and ratings.
Proposition 1.3 On Airbnb, price increases after a positive shock on ratings, and
decrease after a negative shock on ratings. Given the same price P1 at period 1, and
ratings Rairbnb and R̃airbnb published in period 1, we have the following relationship
for prices posted at period 2,
if Rairbnb > R̃airbnb then P2(Rairbnb) > P2(R̃airbnb). (1.25)
Proposition 1.3 shows that the price is responsive to the reputation of the host.
The responsiveness of price to the rating results from the informativeness of the
rating: a host with higher average rating will look more attractive to future guests,
and therefore will have higher expected demand than another host with the same price
but lower ratings. Since the period 2 price is determined by the expected demand,
the host with higher average ratings will increase the price. The formal proof of this
proposition is in Appendix A.
1.3.3 Relaxing the truthful-telling assumption
To show the robustness of our main results, we relax the truth-telling assumption
and allow selection bias in the ratings, as observed in Fradkin et al. (2017). To
accommodate for the selection bias, we assume that the guests have psychological
costs in giving low ratings. These psychological costs deter the guests from publishing
a low rating for a host. For example, as shown in (Fradkin et al. 2017), the guests
that do not report ratings are likely to have a worse experience. Consistent with this
finding, we assume that the guests provide a rating to a host only if the rating is
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above a threshold θi. Formally stated:
1{rating} = 1 iff rh,i > θi (1.26)
When choosing a rating, the guest is not only subject to the psychological cost of
giving a low rating to the host, but also the concern on the informative value of the
ratings. Thus, the guest also incurs disutility when giving an inflated rating. Then,
the ex-post utility of the guest i is given by:
Ui(ei|eh,i) = vi(ei, eh,i)− P − C(ei) + βiri (1.27)
+ 1{rating}[−γi|vi(ei, eh,i)− rh,i|]
where 1{rating} = 1 iff rh,i > θi
and vi(ei, eh,i) ≡ vh + αiu(ei, eh,i),
where 1{rating}[−γi|vi(ei, eh,i) − rh,i|] models the disutility of giving an inflated
rating to the guest and 1{rating} = 1 iff rh,i > θi models the psychological cost
incurred by the guest when giving a low rating to the host.
The following proposition shows that under the selection bias, the average rating
of the host is higher than that under baseline case and the guests who decide not to
disclose ratings have worse experience than those deciding to.
Proposition 1.4 Assume the distribution of θi is independent of the distribution of








where i sort in and i′ sort out.
Proposition 1.4 match the findings in the incentive review experiments in Fradkin
(2015) showing that the selection bias leads to inflated average ratings of the hosts.
Further, in the following proposition we show that the rating informativeness is robust
to the existence of selection or sorting of ratings.
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Proposition 1.5 Assume the distribution of θi is independent of α, then the average
rating of the host on Airbnb is still positively correlated with her weight on mutual









is the average rating of the host.
This proposition shows the robustness of Propositions 1.5 under the non-truth-
telling assumption. This means that even under selection bias, the ratings on Airbnb
reveal the host’s characteristics.
Finally, the next proposition shows that the price on Airbnb still respond to the
ratings.
Proposition 1.6 Assume the distribution of θi is independent of α, then price still
increases with the ratings. Formally, given identical price P1 , price P2, which is
determined by the average rating Rsort, has the following property:
if Rsort > R̃sort, then P2(R
sort) > P2(R̃
sort).
where Rsort and R̃sort are two average ratings gained by the host under sorting of
ratings.
This proposition shows that, when the psychological threshold is independent of
the parameters in the baseline models, the existence of the selection bias does not
significantly alter the ranking among the listings. Therefore, the ranking of the hosts
is still positively determined by the characteristics of the host and thus, the ratings
and reviews are still informative. Therefore, the demand and the price still respond
to the ratings and reviews.
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1.4 Airbnb and data
1.4.1 Airbnb
We use data from Airbnb to motivate our model and test its predictions. Airbnb,
which launched in 2008, is a peer-to-peer marketplace for short term accommodation
rentals. Airbnb hosts offer private or shared accommodation for rent to prospective
guests. The Airbnb marketplace has seen a dramatic growth over the last few years.
At the beginning of 2016 the platform listed approximately 3 million properties from
640,000 hosts in over 150,000 cities and 52 countries. Over 80 million guests have used
Airbnb, and with a market valuation of $30B, Airbnb is one of the world’s largest
accommodation brands.
To build trust among users, Airbnb uses a bilateral reputation system. Hosts
and guests can optionally review each other. The text of these reviews is publicly
disclosed but their star-ratings are not. Instead, Airbnb only discloses average ratings
aggregated across at multiple reviews. Prior to July 2014, Airbnb users had the
option of reviewing each other within a 30-day window following the conclusion of
each stay. During this 30-day window, reviews were revealed as they were submitted.
This sequential revelation mechanism allowed for retaliatory reviewing: the second
reviewer could punish the first reviewer by submitting a negative review in exchange
for receiving a negative review ((Fradkin et al. 2017)). In July 2014 Airbnb made a
major change to its reputation system by shortening the review window to 14 days and
only revealing reviews simultaneously after the review submission deadline. In doing
so, Airbnb lessened the possibility of retaliatory reviewing.To reduce the possibility
of analyzing ratings that are biased by retaliatory reviewing, we limit our dataset to
hosts that entered the Airbnb marketplace from July 2014 onwards.
1.4.2 Data
We compile a novel dataset of Airbnb listing entry, exit, prices, supply, demand,
and reviews. Our dataset is a weekly panel of U.S. Airbnb listings spanning a 17-
month period from the beginning of July 2014 to the end of November 2015. During
this timeframe, we collected information on all US listings and their hosts from the
Airbnb website with weekly frequency. The final panel contains 3, 295, 188 listing-
week observations for 198, 743 distinct listings and 137, 687 distinct hosts, whose


















Figure 1.1: Listing star-rating distribribution
characteristics including location, listing type (e.g., apartment, house, etc.), bed type,
number of listing photos, price, star-rating, and number of reviews. Additionally, for
each host, we observe reviews left and received, and the number of properties listed
by the host on Airbnb.
Airbnb allows hosts to select which days of the year their listings are available for
rent without the need to add or remove the listing from the platform. To do so, hosts
use a calendar, on which they mark available days and set prices. In addition, Airbnb
hosts can make their listings instantly bookable, forgoing the opportunity to reject
certain guests. We collected calendar information (whether a listing was available for
booking, booked, or busy) between September 2014 to September 2015.
Given this data, we define market participation as the fraction of days a property
was listed for rent (regardless of whether a day was eventually booked or not) during
our observation period. The final dataset contains market participation information
for 101, 596 listings and 74, 909 hosts. Out of these listings, 51, 697 have a star-rating
(Airbnb only assigns a star-rating to listings with at least three reviews.) Figure 1.1













Figure 1.2: Probability density function of market participation
both their market participation and star-rating. As in previous work (Fradkin et al.
2017; Zervas et al. 2015), we find that most of the listings (91.6%) have a star-rating
of at least 4.5-stars. In Figure 1.2, we plot the probability density function of market
participation for the same subset of listings, and find that, on average, a listing is
listed on the platform 85% of the time.
For every listing in our data, we have on average 16 weekly observations. Listings
may have fewer or more weekly observations due to entry and exit. The average
listing price is $229, the average number of reviews hosts received from guests is 4.5,
and the average star-rating of these reviews is 4.7. On average, hosts write reviews
that are shorter than the reviews they receive from guests. Hosts in our data received
reviews with an average length of 351 characters, and left reviews 151 characters
long. Finally, by November 2015, the instantly bookable feature is enabled for 30, 767
listings.
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1.5 Evidence of Reciprocity on Airbnb
In this section, we use data from the Airbnb platform to provide empirical evidence
for the predictions of our model. Our model makes two key predictions. First, hosts
that are more reciprocal should have higher ratings. Seconds, higher rated hosts –
which includes hosts that are more reciprocal – should be able to charge higher prices.
1.5.1 The relationship between reciprocity and ratings
Proposition 1.1 of our model states that a host’s ratings on Airbnb are positively
related to the host’s reciprocity weight, αh. In other words, hosts who are more
reciprocal should have higher ratings. To test this prediction we need to know hosts’
reciprocity weights, ah. However, reciprocity is not directly observable. Instead, we
attempt to find proxies in our data that are correlated with reciprocal behavior.
Our first (and preferred) proxy for reciprocity weight is whether the host writes
long reviews about her guests. Intuitively, a host that cares more about the overall
Airbnb experience will take more time to describe this experience in a review. Note
that, as explained in Section 1.4, Airbnb employs a double-blind review mechanism
in which the content (and length) of the host’s review is not disclosed to the guest
until either the guest submits her own review or 14 days have passed. Therefore,
this proxy cannot have a direct impact on guest ratings (e.g., a good review from the
host to the guest cannot incentivize a good review from the same guest to the host.)
Further, the reviews that hosts leave for guests are not displayed on the hosts’ Airbnb
page and, therefore, hosts have little incentive to behave strategically with respect to
reviews they leave for their guests.1 Therefore, we hypothesize that hosts that leave
longer reviews about their guests are more likely to have a higher reciprocity weight.
The second proxy we use is whether the host has activated the “Instant Book”
feature. Similar to hotel reservations, reservation requests for instantly bookable
Airbnb listings do not require explicit host approval. We hypothesize that hosts
using the Instant Book feature have more weight on the reputation utility rj than on
the shared experience utility u(ei, eh).
1To read reviews a host left for past guests one has to: a) find out who the past guests were by
looking at the host profile and checking which guests left a review for the host, b) look up the Airbnb
profiles of each of these guests, and c) manually scanning each guest profile to locate a review left
for the guest by the host in question. We assume that the vast majority of Airbnb users do not
engage in this behavior.
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We test our hypotheses using the following model:
Star-ratingi = β1 log Host-to-Guest Review Lengthi (1.31)
+ β2 Not Instant Bookablei + Xiγ + εi,
where the dependent variable is the star-rating of host i. log Host- to-Guest Review Lengthi
and Not Instant Bookablei, whose coefficients are of interest, are the average (log of
the) length of the reviews written to her guests, and whether the host listing is not
instantly bookable, respectively. In Xi we include a wide set of controls that can
affect the host star-rating. We report the estimates of this regression in Table 1.1.
In column 1 we present our results without any controls. We find that the coeffi-
cients of interest are both positive and significant, suggesting that hosts that write
longer reviews and hosts that do not use the Instant Book feature have, on average,
higher ratings. In column 2, we include a wide array of controls and show that the
coefficients are similar to our previous estimates. These results are consistent our
hypothesis that more reciprocal hosts have, on average, higher ratings.
1.5.2 The relationship between ratings and prices
Next, we provide evidence for Proposition 1.3, which states that listing prices should
increase after a positive shock on ratings and decrease after a negative shock on
ratings.
Estimating the causal impact of ratings on prices is difficult because unobserved
changes in listing quality can simultaneously affect both prices and ratings. For
example, consider a host that invests in quality (e.g., upgrades the bed, or installs a
new air conditioner.) At the same time, since the listing’s quality has improved, the
host also raises the listing’s price. In this case, a regression of ratings on prices will
lead us to mistakenly attribute increased prices to the increase in ratings, when it is
in fact driven by unobserved (to us) changes in listing quality.
To overcome this challenge, our identification strategy exploits a unique charac-
teristic of the Airbnb platform: a listing’s average rating is only disclosed after the
listing accumulates three reviews. Airbnb does not disclose individual review ratings,
therefore listing quality can be inferred only by reading the review content until the
listing average rating is disclosed. This provides us with a natural experiment to test
hosts’ reaction to the disclosure of their average rating.
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Table 1.1: Correlation between host star-rating and reciprocity weight proxies
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Relying on rating disclosures alone is not sufficient to test the relationship between
ratings and prices because unobserved changes to listing quality can happen around
rating disclosure. Convincingly controlling for quality changes is difficult especially
because Airbnb does not disclose the individual ratings associated with reviews. To
minimize endogeneity concerns due to unobserved quality changes correlated with the
timing of ratings disclose, we focus on listings whose ratings (which are a proxy for
quality) up to and including the third review (when the rating disclosure occurs) are
constant.
Despite the fact that listing ratings are not disclosed prior to the third review,
we know that for a listing to obtain an average of 5 stars at the time of disclosure,
the listing must have received three 5-stars reviews (Airbnb rounds ratings to the
nearest half-star, and the only set of three ratings that results in a rounded 5 stars
rating is a set of three 5-stars reviews.) Therefore, to implement our identification
strategy we limit our data to the subset of listings for which the disclosed rounded
average rating after three reviews is 5 stars. Moreover, since we are interested in
the immediate effect of rating disclosure on prices, we only consider listing prices
up to and including the third review. Thus, the treatment effect we estimate is the
average difference in prices between the period when a listing has between zero and
two reviews (the pre-disclosure period), and the period when listings has exactly 3
reviews (the disclosure period.)
In addition to limiting our analysis to listings with constant ratings, we further
control for changes in quality using a number of time-varying listing characteristics.
The following model implements our identification strategy:
log Priceit = βDit + γXit + αi + τt + εit. (1.32)
The dependent variable is the log of the price of listing i in year-week t. Dit, whose
coefficient is of interest, is an indicator of whether the average rating of listing i has
been disclosed at time t. In Xit we include a set of time-varying controls to further
account for changes in listing quality. Further, we include listing (αi) and year-week
(τt) fixed effects, to control for unobserved time invariant listing characteristics and
shocks to prices common across listings, e.g., prices are higher during holiday seasons.
Finally, to account for serial correlation in our dependent variable, we cluster standard
errors at the listing level.
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Table 1.2: The impact of rating disclosure on listing price
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We present the results of this analysis in Table 1.2. In the first column, we report
estimates from a minimum specification without any controls. The coefficient of
interest, β, is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01). Our estimates suggest
that a 5-star average rating disclosure leads to a 1.6% increase in the listing price.
Next, we test the robustness of our results by including a set of time-varying
observable listing characteristics that can potentially affect listing quality and thus
both ratings and price. Specifically, we control the number of pictures associated with
each listing, the type of cancellation policy, the number of Airbnb listings in the same
ZIP code, and several other observable listing attributes that can vary over time. We
report the estimates of this specification in column 2 of Table 1.2. The coefficient of
interest is positive and similar in magnitude to our previous estimate.
Overall, the empirical evidence provided in this section is consistent with the
predictions made in our analytical framework: hosts with higher reciprocity weights
have higher ratings. Further, listing prices respond to changes in reputation, implying
that Airbnb ratings are informative. Taken together, these findings suggest that hosts
who are more reciprocal can charge higher prices.
1.6 Alternative explanations
Our analytical model of reciprocity can explain the rating patterns observed on
Airbnb, including the fact that casual hosts have higher ratings than professional
hosts. However, reciprocity is not the only way to explain this phenomenon. In this
section, we discuss various plausible alternative models and explain why the we be-
lieve that these alternative models do not easily fit the patterns we observe in our
data. Specifically, we show that allowing for biased ratings, risk aversion, endogenous
quality, or altruistic behavior cannot easily explain the observation that casual hosts
have higher ratings than professional hosts. We discuss the intuition behind these
alternative models next, and we refer the reader to Appendix B for a formal analysis.
Exogenous quality We start by considering a simple model where service quality
is private information of the host, and guests infer quality from publicly available
ratings. Quality is exogenously given and fixed across transactions. We assume a
monopoly host who maximizes expected profits by choosing prices. All players report
their true utility in their ratings. Under this model, for casual hosts to have higher
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ratings than professional hosts, we need to assume that market participation and
service quality are negatively correlated. While in principle this relationship could
hold, in practice we should expect professional hosts to strive to maintain higher
ratings than casual hosts because they are more reliant on Airbnb revenue.
Relaxing the truth-telling assumption So far we have assumed that players
truthfully report ratings. However, on many peer-to-peer platforms negative ratings
are under-reported (Fradkin et al. 2017; Dellarocas and Wood 2008). We can extend
our model to allow for selection in reporting ratings, and show that this extension
does not help to explain the observed patterns. Under selection, guests incur a cost
associated with giving low ratings, and hence, only high ratings are reported. In
this variant of the simple model, to explain that casual hosts have higher ratings
than professional hosts we need to assume that the former are more likely to interact
with guests who face higher costs from leaving low ratings. This assumption would
drastically reduce the informativeness of ratings, contrary to findings in the literature
(Fradkin et al. 2017) and what we see in our data.
Relaxing the risk neutral assumption As a final attempt to use the simple
model to explain the empirical facts, we relax the risk neutrality assumption and
assume that the guests behavior affects the host’s welfare. We still assume that the
service quality is exogenously given and guests truthfully report their utility in their
ratings. In this model, the risk aversion towards misconduct of the guests induces
the host to increase her price and lower the transaction volume. However, since the
host cannot endogenously choose the service effort, the higher ratings of casual hosts
are indicative of their better service quality. This means that to explain that casual
hosts have higher ratings than professionals, we still need to assume that casual hosts
have exogenously higher service quality than professional hosts.
Endogenous service quality So far, we argued that under the exogenous quality
assumption it is difficult to explain why professional hosts have lower ratings. Next,
we assume that service quality — the effort exerted by the host in each transaction
— is endogenously chosen, and can vary between transactions. In this model, guests
report the host’s effort in their ratings. Therefore, since future guests infer the host’s
service quality from prior ratings, higher ratings generate higher expected demand.
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Thus, ratings incentivize hosts to exert effort. Because professional hosts should rely
more heavily on Airbnb revenue than casual hosts, they should also have stronger
incentives to exert higher levels of effort. This, would result in higher ratings for
professional hosts, contradicting our empirical observations. The models we have
considered so far suggest that when reputation is the sole incentive for exerting effort,
it is difficult to explain the fact that professional hosts have lower ratings.
Introducing interdependent preferences As a final attempt to explain the ob-
served rating patterns without introducing reciprocity, we allow the host to have
interdependent preferences, i.e., the utility of guest i, denoted as Ui, enters into the
host’s utility function. This approach is similar to the one used in our analytical
framework, but in this case we do not allow hosts and guests to be reciprocal. Under
interdependent preferences, casual hosts have higher ratings than professional hosts
if casual hosts have a higher weight on the guests’ welfare than professional hosts. In
other words, casual hosts would have to be altruistic than professional hosts. While
in principle this could be true, we claim that altruistic behavior on Airbnb, which
requires that a host behaves well independently of a guest’s behavior, is a stronger
assumption that reciprocity, which requires that a host behaves well in response to a
guest’s good behavior.
1.7 Discussion and conclusion
Two salient characteristics of the sharing economy make these marketplaces unique
and interesting to study. First, during a transaction, buyers and sellers are likely to
interact closely. Second, because transactions are between peers rather than firms
and customers, sellers have a much lower market power than they do in traditional
markets. Because of these characteristics, the behavior of buyers and sellers in peer-
to-peer markets can be substantially different from traditional marketplaces.
In this paper, we develop an analytical framework that, by introducing reciprocity
– the tendency to increase effort in response to others’ increased effort – can explain
how buyers and sellers interact in these markets. We show that reciprocity can
improve the welfare of reciprocal peers, who can obtain higher ratings and charge
higher prices. We test the key predictions of our analytical framework using data
collected from Airbnb, a popular peer-to-peer rental accommodation website.
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We contribute to the existing literature on the sharing economy by deepening our
understanding of how trust is generated in these marketplaces. We show that reci-
procity informally regulates players’ behavior and generates cooperation. Moreover,
we show that more reciprocal sellers are rewarded with higher ratings and that bilat-
eral reputation systems, such as the one implemented by Airbnb, are more responsive
to this kind of behavior than unilateral review systems. Thus, bilateral review sys-
tems better serve the purpose of creating trust among users. Further, our work has
important implications for market designers. Because our model shows that reci-
procity affects the market equilibrium, matching buyers and sellers, and promoting
reciprocal behavior play a central role. While a good matching mechanism can induce
positive reciprocity which, in turn, increases the welfare of both hosts and guests, a
bad matching can trigger negative reciprocity that will worsen the overall experience.
Our work has two important limitations. First, while our model relies on reci-
procity to explain the ratings observed on Airbnb, other assumptions could lead to
similar rating patterns. Second, empirically measuring reciprocity is difficult. Most
of the past literature relies on controlled experiments to measure the effects of reci-
procity. Instead, we rely on proxy measures of reciprocity that, while appealing, are
also imperfect.
Overall, our paper represents a first step towards understanding the drivers of
user behavior in the sharing economy by combining a theoretical model incorporating
reciprocity with data from a large peer-to-peer market.
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Chapter 2
Error Costs, Ratio Tests, and Patent Antitrust Law
Co-authored with Keith N. Hylton
2.1 Introduction
This paper examines the welfare tradeoff between patent and antitrust law. Patent
law enables the patent holder to obtain and exploit a monopoly lawfully. Antitrust
law regulates the acquisition, maintenance, and, to some degree, the exploitation of
monopoly power.
Since patent and antitrust law have superficially contradictory goals, the question
that naturally arises is how one should choose between the two in instances where
there appears to be a conflict. There are methods of exploiting patent monopolies
that have been treated as antitrust violations. For example, the Federal Trade Com-
mission recently sued Qualcomm, a manufacturer of communications technology, on
the theory that the firm had abused its patent monopoly by adopting a two-part
pricing scheme in the licensing and sale of its smartphone semiconductor chips.
One sensible approach to choosing between two legal standards, or two proof
standards with respect to evidence, is to consider the relative costs of errors. Ov-
erenforcement generates “false positives,” cases where the regulated firm is punished
or prohibited from taking a certain action when society should prefer that the action
be taken. Underenforcement generates “false negatives,” cases where society should
prefer that the excused firm be punished or prohibited from taking action.
The approach in this paper is to consider the ratio of false positives to false neg-
atives in the patent antitrust area. A high error cost would imply that antitrust
should be reluctant to restrain patentees. Moreover, proof standards and legal doc-
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trines should be biased toward protecting innovation incentives.
We find that the relevant error cost ratio for patent antitrust is the ratio of the sum
of the monopoly profit and the residual consumer surplus to the deadweight loss. This
is different from the profit-deadweight loss (reward-social loss) ratio advanced in the
literature (Kaplow, 1984; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer, 1990). The reward-
loss ratio is a doubtful measure of the patent-antitrust welfare tradeoff because it does
not take into account the residual surplus to consumers, and thereby underweights
the social value of innovation.
We find that the error cost ratio, for a wide variety of deterministic demand
functions, ranges from infinity to a low of roughly three. This supports a bias, when
designing legal standards and proof standards in patent antitrust law, in favor of the
patent holder.
2.2 Baseline Model
We assume patent protection gives the innovator a monopoly in a market that exists
only because of a prior investment by the innovator. In the first period, the prospec-
tive patentee invests in innovation, and in the second period, the innovator is awarded
a patent (with probability one) that guarantees a monopoly in the market created by
the innovation.1 The costs of innovation are sunk when the second period arrives.
The patentee-monopolist faces a downward-sloping inverse demand curve p = p(q)
and constant marginal cost of c. The firm’s profit maximization problem is
max
q
: π(q) = p(q)q − cq.
The monopolistic output q? satisfies the familiar optimality condition p′(q?)q? +









= c. The patentee anticipates all of this when he invests
in innovation in the first period.
Under competition, price would marginal cost, pc = c, and the competitive quan-
1An alternative version of innovation, more consistent with process inventions, assumes that
innovation consists of reducing the cost of producing some good in an existing market. The version
here, where innovation creates a new market, and the aforementioned alternative are the same when
the process innovation reduces cost to such a degree that the innovator gets the entire market to














Figure 2.1: Error Cost Ratio
tity qc = p−1(pc). Figure 1 illustrates the standard monopoly outcome, with profit
denoted by Π, the residual surplus denoted RS , and deadweight loss, from constrain-
ing output below the competitive level, D .
2.3 Error Cost Ratio
In this part, we consider the welfare tradeoffs of antitrust enforcement in the intellec-
tual property area. Although we focus on patents, the model applies equally to many
other types of intellectual property (copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks).
Figure 2.1 illustrates our basic argument. In the figure, pBE is the break-even
price necessary for the innovator to recover the fixed (sunk) costs of innovation. If
the price the firm expects to receive in the second period is less than the break-even
price, the firm will not invest in innovation (research and development, R&D).
We incorporate antitrust, in Figure 1, as a mechanism that operates as a price
regulation, p̂. This is different from the more traditional economic model of antitrust
operating as a penalty imposed on monopolizing firms.2 Here, antitrust operates as an
2See Becker (1968), Landes (1983), Hylton and Lin (2014).
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injunction, constraining the firm from choosing its preferred price-output combination
along the demand curve.
If the anticipated antitrust-regulated price cap is greater than the break-even price,
the firm will innovate and charge up to the price cap. If the anticipated antitrust
price cap is less than the break-even price, the firm will not invest in the first period,
and no entry will occur.
The most stringent antitrust regime is equivalent to a price cap equal to marginal
cost. In this case, antitrust is so effective that the innovator will be forced to charge
the competitive price in the second period. Obviously, investment will occur in the
first period, in this case, only if the break-even price is equal to marginal cost. That
will occur only if research and development is essentially costless, which is likely to be
rare. An example of an injunctive policy that would implement a price cap equal to
marginal cost is a rule denying enforceability to the patent, thus opening the market
to competition and driving price down to marginal cost.
The most relaxed antitrust regime would set the effective price cap at the monopoly
price p?. With an antitrust-regulated price cap greater than or equal to the monopoly
price, the innovator would never be deterred by the threat of antitrust regulation from
investing.
Perfect antitrust, in this model, reduces to setting the antitrust price cap equal to
the break-even price. With the antitrust cap set at the break-even price, the innovator
will invest, and society will get the benefit from innovation with the smallest possible
deadweight loss.
If the antitrust price cap is less than the break-even price, society loses the gain
from innovation. The firm will not invest in innovation and the minimum social loss
is the sum of consumer’s surplus and the firm’s profit in the unconstrained regime,




Society does not lose the potential welfare captured by area D in Figure 2.1 because
this portion of the potential surplus from innovation would never have been available
to society in the unconstrained regime.3
3All of this assumes, of course, that the patent award is based on an innovation rather than a
fraud on the patent office, or corruption in the patent system. In the latter case, no new surplus
is created, and the social loss from setting the price cap below the break-even price would be zero.
Consider, for example, a patent for playing cards, as in Darcy v. Allein, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B.
31
In contrast, if the antitrust-regulated price cap is greater than the break-even





Errors, in this framework, are deviations from perfect antitrust enforcement. An
error in the direction of excessive enforcement, where the antitrust price cap is below
the break-even price, results in “false conviction” or “false positive” costs. Errors in the
direction of too little enforcement, where the antitrust price cap is greater than the
break-even price, result in “false acquittal” or “false negative” costs. For enforcement
authorities, the error cost ratio - that is, the ratio of false positive costs to false
negative costs - provides guidance on the optimal direction of any bias due to errors
in enforcement. For adjudicatory tribunals, the error cost ratio provides guidance on
the standard of proof that should govern in disputes over whether a firm has violated
antitrust law. More generally, the error cost ratio also serves as a measure of the
welfare tradeoff relevant to any conflict between the scope of the patent laws and the
scope of antitrust laws. This measure of the welfare tradeoff differs from the ratio
test (reward-to-social-loss ratio) advanced in parts of the patent antitrust literature.








This quotient provides a lower-bound measure, taking account the different levels of
stringency in antitrust enforcement, of the ratio of the cost of excessive enforcement
(false convictions) to the cost of inadequate enforcement (false acquittals) in the
patent antitrust area.
Under traditional decision theory arguments (Kaplan, 1968; Burtis, Gelbach,
Kobayashi, 2018), an error cost ratio equal to one would justify a balanced approach
to the standard of proof, such as the preponderance standard. Such a standard would
treat prospective errors in the direction of excessive enforcement as equally costly as
prospective errors in the direction of lenient enforcement. On the other hand, a ratio
1603). As a general matter one could introduce a measure of the probability of “real” innovation
(in contrast to fraudulent) and multiply the sum of profit and residual surplus by such a “validity
probability” to arrive at a measure of the social loss. The analysis here assumes (implicitly) that
the validity probability is one.
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of one third would justify an approach that favors patent challengers (implementers),
say by adopting a rebuttable presumption of guilt in patent-antitrust cases. A ratio
considerably higher than one, such as three, would justify a proof standard favoring
the innovator.
These implications of the error cost ratio should be considered while also taking
into account that it is a minimum estimate. Thus, if the ratio presented above is
greater than one, given a particular market structure, the actual ratio in applications
to specific regulatory interventions within the particular market typically will be even
greater. If the ratio is greater than one, then the case for adopting a proof standard
favoring the innovator is even stronger than implied by the numerical value of the
ratio.
Simply looking at the ratio formula, however, it is impossible to tell what the
value of it might be. It seems plausible, initially, that some market structures might
generate a high ratio, and others might generate a low ratio. In the abstract, a demand
function could take a shape that could generate almost any positive numerical value
as a ratio estimate. However, we limit the range of possibilities below by examining
plausible and widely used functional forms.
We analyze the error cost ratio first by a linear demand function. Then we relax
the assumption to show that the qualitative results are robust over several commonly
used demand assumptions.
2.3.1 Linear Demand
Assume the demand function takes the form p = A − bq, where A > 0 and b > 0.
The basic results are summarized in Proposition 1. Later, in the next subsection, we
show that the qualitative result holds under more robust assumptions on the demand
function.
Proposition 2.1 (Linear Demand). If the demand curve is linear and marginal







Under linear demand, the error cost ratio is a constant value of three. If the er-
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ror cost ratio happened to be one, there would be a credible argument for adopting
a balanced approach to patent antitrust where the risk of excessive enforcement is
equated with the risk of inadequate enforcement. In terms of proof standards for
adjudication, this would be equivalent to a preponderance test. However, an error
cost ratio of three is more consistent with a biased approach to the risk of excessive
enforcement, where the bias favors leniency toward the regulated party (Burtis, Gel-
bach, Kobayashi, 2018). Alternatively, the ratio of three suggests in the adjudication
setting a “clear and convincing” standard of proof. We consider below whether this
implication is also valid for other common representations of consumer demand.
2.3.2 Power-law Demand
In this part we consider power-law demand functions, such as the isoelastic, algebraic,
and exponential forms. The advantage of these forms over the linear is that they
better represent demand in settings of wealth inequality or where a relatively small
number of consumers bid intensively for the good (e.g, medical care).
Consider the algebraic demand form, p = αqβ − σ, β ∈ (−1, 0). After that, we
will examine the results under isoelastic and exponential functional form. Linear and
isoelastic demand functions are special cases of the algebraic form. In particular, if
α = −b, β = 1, and σ = −A, the algebraic demand function turns to be a linear
demand function. If σ = 0, the algebraic demand function becomes an isoelastic
demand function, p = αqβ.
Proposition 2.2 (Algebraic Demand). If the demand curve is algebraic p =
αqβ − σ, β ∈ (−1, 0), and marginal cost is a constant c, then the minimum false








and the maximum false


























which ranges, as the elasticity of demand increases, from +∞ to a lower bound of
1
e/2−1 .
4We deliberately express this as the difference of two areas (RS+Π+D - (RS +Π)) to facilitiate
comparison of the areas under the demand curve.
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The algebraic demand form does not generate a constant elasticity. Elasticity is
ε(p) = − p
β(p+σ)
, so introducing the parameter ε, where ε ≡ − 1
β
, allows us to examine
the behavior of the error cost ratio as demand elasticity goes to infinity.5 As demand
becomes more inelastic, the error cost ratio approaches infinity. As demand becomes
more elastic, the error cost ratio falls to its lower bound of 1
e/2−1 ≈ 2.8.
In more intuitive terms, Proposition 2 says that for relatively uncompetitive mar-
kets - where the elasticity of demand is still above but close to one - the error cost
ratio is extremely high. For such markets, the sum of profit and consumer surplus is
very large relative to deadweight loss, and society loses much more than one dollar
for each dollar of deadweight loss avoided through excessive antitrust regulaiton. The
error cost ratio falls toward its lower bound of roughly 2.8 as the market moves toward
perfect competition.
Proposition 2.3 (Isoelastic Demand). If the demand curve is isoelastic p = αqβ,
β ∈ (−1, 0), and marginal cost is a constant c, then the minimum false conviction





























This case delivers the same result as the algebraic demand case, and again the
error cost ratio ranges with the elasticity of demand from positive infinity to a limiting
lower bound of 1
e/2−1 . Figure 2 shows the relationship between the error cost ratio
and the elasticity of demand for the isoelastic case.6
Proposition 2.4 (Exponential Demand). If the demand curve is exponential
form q = γe−βp, β > 0, and marginal cost is a constant c, then the minimum false
5Since the dependent variable of interest is the error cost ratio, which assumes optimization
by the monopolist, we could just as well examine the point elasticity at the optimal output level.
Substituting the monopoly price, ε(p∗) = − cβ(c+σ)+
σ
c+σ , so that the parameter ε ≡ −
1
β closely
tracks the relevant point elasticity measure. If σ is small relative to c, then the parameter is a nearly
precise measure of point elasticity at the privately optimal quantity.
6In Figure 2.2, the error cost ratio is equal to 3 when elasticity is equal to 2, equal to 4 when
elasticity is roughly 1.3, and equal to 6 when elasticity is roughly 1.1.
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Like the linear case, exponential demand delivers an error cost ratio that is inde-
pendent of market structure as measured by the elasticity of demand. Of the demand
functions considered in this part, the exponential generates the lowest error cost ra-
tio, which is a constant value of 1
e/2−1 ≈ 2.8.
7 The linear and the exponential also
share the feature that there is a maximum price that consumers are willing to pay,
above which demand falls to zero. However, in most markets, there is always some
consumer willing to bid up the price of a scarce item. In particular, in markets char-
acterized by wealth inequality among consumers, the wealthiest consumers can bid
up the price of a scarce and highly desirable good (e.g., housing) to a level that is
quite well beyond affordability for the average consumer. Given this, the algebraic
probably best captures the features of real markets.
2.4 Model Extension
This section presents an extended model incorporating the probability of violating
antitrust law to explicitly model the firm’s stage-1 investment decision and the error
cost ratio. The reason is to separate the effect of market structure on the probability
of entry (investment) and on the error cost ratio. By separating these two effects, we
can capture both the static and dynamic effects of changes in market structure on
the error cost ratio.
At stage 1, the firm observes the R&D investment cost K and decides whether to
invest in innovation. The choice variable at stage 1 is denoted as r ∈ {0, 1}, where
r = 1 denotes the firm invests in R&D and enters the subgame of stage 2, and r = 0
denotes the firm dose not enter and the game ends. If r = 1, the firm incurs the
7That the error cost ratio for the exponential is less than that of the linear is consistent with the
feature that the ratio of the monopolistic output to the competitive output is lower in the exponential
case than in the linear case. The monopolistic output level is half of the competitive output level
in the linear case, whereas in the exponential case the monopolistic level is equal to the competitive
level divided by the natural base e. Since the deadweight loss from monopoly is generally greater
under exponential demand, the error cost ratio is lower.
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Figure 2.2: Error Cost Ratio and Demand Elasticity
fixed cost of R&D and enters into stage 2. At stage 2, the firm is possibly faced with
antitrust challenge. Let v denote the probability that the firm is held violating the
antitrust law and gets zero economic profit in stage 2.
This framework differs from the previous part by treating antitrust enforcement
as “all or nothing”. As a result, the error cost ratio is the same as before, though this
time it represents the consistent value, given a specific demand curve, rather than
the minimum taking account different levels of enforcement stringency. However,
the probability of enforcement affects the incentive to invest and the likelihood of
deadweight loss arising.
2.4.1 Stage-1 Choice
Assume that the probability of antitrust legal enforcement is fixed at a level v, v ∈
(0, 1). The innovation investment costK follows cumulative density function F , which
is differentiable and its derivative F ′(K) .= f(K) is positive everywhere. Assume the
firm is risk neutral.
We solve the firm’s entry game by backward induction. From our proceeding
result in the previous section, if the firm continues to stage 2 as a monopoly, it charges
monopoly price p∗ and gets monopoly profit π∗. Given that v is the probability that
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the firm is held in violation of the antitrust law, the expected stage-2 utility is
E [U2(r = 1)] = (1− v)π∗,
where r = 1 means that the firm invests in R&D in stage 1, U2 denotes the firm’s
utility at stage 2. If the firm does not invest in R&D, it earns zero. It optimizes by
choosing whether to invest or not in stage 1. Thus the firm’s stage 1 maximal utility
is
U1 = max {E [U2(r = 1)]−K, 0} .
Therefore, the firm invests in R&D to continue in stage 2, if and only if E [U2(r = 1)]−
K ≥ 0, that is,
r = 1 if and only if (1− v)π∗ ≥ K.
Let θ denote the probability that the firm invests in R&D, and is called probability
of entry in later analysis.8 We have the following expression for θ,
θ
.
= Probability{(1− v)π∗ ≥ K} = F [(1− v)π∗] .
To study the effect of market structure on firm’s R&D investment decision, we




= f ((1− v)π∗) · (1− v) > 0. (2.1)
The condition in Equation (2.1) indicates, in accord with intuition, that the firm’s
investment decision depends positively on the monopoly profit expected at stage 2.
The Probability of Entry and the Adjusted Error Cost Ratio As analyzed
in the proceeding part, if the firm does not invest in R&D, the society loses RS+π. If
8Because R&D investment is a fixed amount, the optimality decision for the patentee is straight-
forward, unlike the Nordaus (1967) model where the innovator chooses the amount to invest in
innovation and therefore equates the marginal cost of investment with its marginal private benefit.
Treating R&D investment as a lump sum seems defensible, since the end goal of the innovator is
some definite new product in this model. The inventor cannot invest half of the required amount
in R&D and get half of the result. The variation in K reflects the assumption that the cost of the
required investment is greater for some innovators than for others.
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the firm invests in R&D and monopolizes in stage 2, the society loses monopoly dead-
weight loss D. Taking the firm’s R&D probability into consideration, the adjusted










The effect of entry probability on error cost is captured by the partial derivative of ρ̃












Thus, the error cost ratio decreases as the likelihood of innovation investment in-
creases, and this negative relationship grows at an increasing rate. Other things
equal, excessive enforcement is less harmful to society where there are strong in-
centives to invest because of high expected monopoly profits or low research and
development costs. In addition, a little increase in the investment probability has a
larger downward effect on the error cost ratio in an industry where firms have more
and frequent R&D than in an industry with less R&D intensity.
2.4.2 Effect of Market Structure
The price elasticity of demand is an important feature of market structure, and usually
varies across industries (Johnson and Helmberger, 1967). A number of industry-
specific characteristics contribute to the pattern of demand elasticity, such as the
degree of substitutability between goods. If a product does not have substitutes,
such as some drugs and treatments for rare diseases, the product’s demand is likely
to be inelastic. Path dependence (switching costs) is another factor giving rise to
inelastic demand (Klemperer, 1987). Path dependence is a common feature observed
in the demand for high tech products, such as online platforms and operating systems.
Because consumers take time to adapt to a new technology, they tend to continue
using related products from the same firm and are willing to pay a price premium for
doing so.9
9One example is Android system or iOS. After a consumer purchases the first Apple product
and gets used to the iOS system, the iOS shapes the consumer’s habit of using smartphones. If she
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2.4.2.1 Negative relationship between elasticity and profit.
Generally speaking, a low demand elasticity reveals the consumer’s high tolerance
to price increases, and that the monopolist can exploit this high tolerance to earn
more profits. In this sense, an industry with low demand elasticity is favorable for a
monopoly firm (Kamien and Schwartz (1970)). Of course, demand elasticity varies
along the demand curve in most cases. To study the effect of demand elasticity on
proft, we will first have to construct a parameter that tracks the elasticity measure
at all points along the demand curve. By examining the relationship between such a
measure of elasticity and profit, we can draw inferences on the relationship between
market structure and profitability.
We start by considering the “power” demand functions: isoelastic, algebraic, and
exponential. For the isoelastic form p = αqβ, β < 0, the price elasticity of demand
is simply ε = − 1
β
, which obviously tracks elasticity at all points along the demand














Generally, the elasticity of demand for each of the power demand functions can be
expressed as ε(p) ≡ εf(p), where the ε is a parameter that tracks the elasticity of
demand. In the algebraic case ε(p) = − p
β(p+σ)
, so that ε = − 1
β
and f(p) = p
(p+σ)
. In
the isoelastic case ε = − 1
β
andf(p) = 1. In the exponential case, ε(p) = −βp, so that
ε = β and f(p) = p. For this class of demand functions, (2) holds.
Although the parameterization is not as straightforward, a similar decomposi-
tion can be accomplished with linear demand, where the same negative relationship
between profit and the elasticity tracking parameter holds.10
changes to the Android system, it takes her time to adjust.







, with elasticity tracking parameter defined as ε = 1A .
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2.4.2.2 Dynamic Effect of Market Structure on Error Cost Ratio.
Recall that in section 3, we demonstrated that the probability of investment (en-
try) increases with monopoly profit. Combining this with the negative relationship
between profit and demand elasticity, we expect that the inelastic market demand









To consider the effect of market structure on the error cost ratio, we analyze the















 − ρθ2 ∂θ∂ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
dynamic effect
 , (2.4)
where the first part in Equation (2.4), which is negative, is the static effect of elastic-
ity on the error cost ratio, discussed in section 2. The second term, which is positive,
captures the dynamic effect of the demand elasticity on the error cost ratio. As the
post-patent award market becomes more competitive, because of the greater avail-
ability of substitutes, investment and entry are less likely, increasing the error cost
ratio. On one hand, low elasticity leads a higher monopoly profit and residual surplus
relative to deadweight loss, leading to a larger error cost as the direct impact, which
we call the static effect in this model. On the other hand, the higher monopoly profit
expected in stage 2 encourages entry, partially offsetting the static effect.
The conflicting static and dynamic effects suggest that the relationship between
demand elasticity and error cost is not negative as suggested in some of our earlier
analysis of demand functions. The limiting ratio derived for the algebraic and isoelas-
tic cases is larger than 1
e/2−1 when the entry/investment effect is taken into account.
Indeed, for the linear and exponential cases, where the static effect is zero, increasing
demand elasticity (making the market more competitive) generates only a dynamic
effect, raising the error cost ratio.
41
2.4.2.3 Example: Isoelastic Demand and Uniform Distribution.
As an illustration, assume demand is isoelastic and that the probability distribution
that determines θ is uniform, i.e., the R&D investment cost K follows a uniform
distribution on (0, K̄], where K̄ denotes the upper bound of investment cost. It
follows that if expected profit is greater than the upper bound on investment cost,
the firm is sure to enter. If expected profit is below the upper bound, then the entry
probability is determined by the cumulative distribution function of K. Formally, we
have
θ =
1 if (1− v)π∗ ≥ K̄,(1−v)π∗
K̄
if (1− v)π∗ < K̄.
The adjusted error cost ratio taking into account the dynamic effect of enforcement















]−1 if (1− v)π∗ < K̄,




































The first line in equation (2.5) reflects the static effect, which is negative,11 while







is the derivative of the error cost ratio with respect to ε. We have shown in Section














This illustrates our argument that the static effect takes negative sign.
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the second line is that of the dynamic effect, which is positive.12 Whether the static
effect dominates the dynamic effect depends on the comparison of the absolute values























If this condition holds (2.6), the static effect is dominant and the adjusted error cost
ratio decreases with elasticity. Otherwise, the error cost ratio increases with elasticity,
the opposite of our result in Section 2.
Figure 2.3 shows a simulation of the relationship between static and dynamic
effects, and of the relationship between the adjusted and static error cost ratios.
Both figures assume a modest antitrust enforcement probability of 0.2.13 As shown in
Figure 3a, the dynamic effect overtakes the static effect after the elasticity becomes
greater than 1.06, when the enforcement probability is low.
Figure 3b compares the error cost ratio and the adjusted error cost ratio curves.
For relatively low elasticity values, the adjusted error cost ratio is below the error
cost ratio. For relatively high elasticity levels, the adjusted curve is above the static
error cost ratio, eventually going to infinity. The intuition behind this pattern is the
following. For high elasticity values, the market is relatively competitive, and profit
expectations are low. As a result, the rate of entry/investment is low, and approaching
zero as the market becomes perfectly competitive. Because entry is so low, and the
expectant deadweight loss from monopoly pricing therefore low, the adjusted error
cost ratio steadily goes to infinity.
Conversely, when the demand elasticity is relatively low, so that the market is
not competitive, firms expected to earn relatively large profits. Now the likelihood of
12As the expected profit, investment cost and the error cost ratio are all positive, we have
K̄
(1−v)π∗ ρ > 0. From the negative relationship between elasticity and monopoly profit under isoelastic
demand (appendix A3), we have that ln( εε−1 )− ln
α












This implies a positive dynamic effect of demand elasticity on the error cost ratio.
13Other parameter assumptions are K̄ = 2, c = 8, α = 2. The same parameter values are assumed
in Appendix B which shows adjusted ratios under other enforcement probability.
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(a) Static vs. Dynamic Effects























(b) Error Cost Ratio and Adjusted Ratio
Figure 2.3: Adjusted Error Cost Ratio
entry and investment is high, reducing the adjusted error cost ratio below its static
counterpart.
Though the adjusted error cost ratio dips below the (static) error cost ratio for low
elasticity values (i.e., uncompetitive markets), note that it is always well above the
asymptotic limit of 1
e/2−1 for the isoelastic demand case. Indeed, the minimum value
of the adjusted error cost ratio in this simulation is greater than five. In the appendix
we consider additional simulations with higher probabilities of enforcement, one inter-
mediate with the probability enforcement set at 0.5 and the other a high-enforcement
regime with a probability of 0.8. In both of the additional simulations the adjusted
error cost ratio is greater, at each elasticity value, than in modest enforcement regime
simulated in Figure 3.
Although we believe the assumptions in these simulations are reasonable, we do
not intend to suggest that they provide a representation of the relationship of the error
cost ratio to the adjusted error cost ratio for every conceivable demand function or
investment cost distribution. It is possible to generate an example where the adjusted
ratio falls below one. Indeed, in the case of exponential demand, where the error cost
ratio has a constant value, the adjusted ratio could start from a level below the error
cost ratio (for low elasticity) before going to infinity.14 Given this, a measure of the
14For high enforcement probabilities, the adjusted error cost ratio curve will always be above the
error cost ratio curve for all elasticity parameter values. However, for low enforcement probabilities
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average value of the adjusted error cost ratio over a wide range of elasticity values
might offer a preferable single measurement.
2.5 Implications
The foregoing analysis has examined the welfare tradeoffs of antitrust enforcement in
the innovation setting. We have focused on antitrust regulation of patentees, though
the issues addressed here apply to any area where firms make investments that create
new markets or substantially enhance existing markets. The tradeoffs examined here
have implications for many facets of law enforcement. First, society must determine
the level of resources to pour into the antitrust enforcement effort against patent
holders. In other words, what is the optimal probability of enforcement when monop-
olists have obtained their status through innovation? Second, society must determine
an optimal legal standard - for example, whether to apply a per se prohibition, a
per se legality rule, or a rule of reason test. Third, society must choose the optimal
standard of proof in trials, where the occurrence of an antitrust violation under the
operable legal standard is uncertain. For each of these questions, the tradeoff between
the costs of excessive enforcement and the costs of inadequate enforcement should be
considered in determining the features of an optimal enforcement system.
In this paper’s model, we begin with a perfect enforcement ideal, and consider the
cost of deviating from the ideal toward excessive enforcement, and the cost of devi-
ating from the ideal toward inadequate enforcement. The ratio of these two costs,
which we label the error cost ratio, constitutes the appropriate welfare ratio test for
determining optimal antitrust enforcement in the patent context. The perfect enforce-
ment ideal is met when antitrust enforcement enables the innovating monopolist to
recover its research and development costs, and also prevents the firm from imposing
unnecessary deadweight loss on society.
Using the foregoing approach to defining perfect enforcement, we find that the
error cost ratio for patent antitrust, or alternatively the appropriate welfare tradeoff
ratio for patent antitrust, is equal to the sum of the monopoly profit and the residual
consumer surplus all divided by the deadweight loss. This finding contradicts the view
it is possible to get a range of low elasticity values where the adjusted error cost curve is below
the error cost curve under certain parameter values, but this requires an assumption that the upper
bound on investment cost in the uniform probability model is modest relative to expected profit.
Such an assumption would appear to go against intuition.
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suggested in the literature (Kaplow, 1984; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer,
1990) that the relevant welfare ratio for patent antitrust is the profit divided by the
deadweight loss (reward-loss ratio).
The reward-loss ratio appears to be invalid for assessing the welfare tradeoffs in
patent antitrust because it accords inadequate weight to the residual surplus going to
consumers, and in doing so undercounts the social value of innovation. One immediate
implication is that prescriptions for patent antitrust law based on the reward-loss
framework should be reconsidered from a perspective that gives greater consideration
to the social incentive to innovate.
We find that the error cost ratio is always above one, and generally declines as
function of market competitiveness as measured by the elasticity of demand. The
minimum value of the ratio is roughly equal to three under commonly used demand
functions. When the effects of enforcement on innovation are taken into account, the
adjusted error cost ratio is likely to be even greater, and tends toward infinity as
the elasticity of demand increases. These results suggest that society should show a
greater concern for the costs of excessive enforcement than the costs of inadequate
enforcement of antitrust in the patent context. The law should err on the side of
protecting innovation incentives.
These implications have immediate practical relevance. There are novel theories
of antitrust being applied to patentees currently. In an ongoing lawsuit against Qual-
comm, the FTC claims that the firm’s patent licensing fees are an abusive exercise of
monopoly power. Such efforts to introduce antitrust regulation into areas that had
until recently been controlled almost entirely by patent law should be assessed under
a consideration of the associated error costs. An attack on patent pricing as a form
of monopoly abuse is equivalent to introducing price regulation through antitrust.
Determination of the welfare-maximizing antitrust price cap, which encourages in-
novation and at the same time avoids unnecessary deadweight loss, is subject to
uncertainty. Such an effort should err on the side of protecting innovation incentives,
given the high ratio of false-positive costs to false-negative costs.
In other areas of litigation, courts must determine whether to apply a per se
legality test, per se illegality test, or rule of reason test to alleged antitrust violations
by patent holders.15 For example, settlements of patent infringement lawsuits were
until recently examined under antitrust according to a per se legality test. Such
15On error costs and legal tests in antirust, see Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009).
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settlements have typically involved the patent holder transferring a share of the patent
revenue to the challenger, which traditionally has been deemed within the power of
a patent holder. The Supreme Court overturned the per se legality rule and replaced
it with a rule of reason test, for pharmaceutical patent infringement settlements,
in FTC v. Actavis.16 The rule of reason test has led to numerous lawsuits against
pharmaceutical patent holders for entering into settlements with generic drug makers.
The error cost ratios examined here suggest that the Actavis analysis should be
conducted in a manner that takes into consideration the high error cost ratio for
patent antitrust.17
Lastly, there is the question of the appropriate standard of proof in antitrust
challenges of patent holders. The error cost ratio, when applied to this question,
would support a high burden of proof, such as requiring clear and convincing evidence
to support antitrust theories.
2.6 Conclusion
The error cost ratio - that is, the ratio of false-positive to false-negative costs - for
patent antitrust is equal to the sum of the monopoly profit and residual consumer
surplus all divided by the deadweight loss. We find that this ratio ranges from infinity,
in uncompetitive markets (no substitutes to the patent), to a low of roughly three,
in competitive markets, for commonly used demand functions. When we extend the
analysis to take enforcement’s effect on entry into account, we find that the range of
values for the ratio is even higher under reasonable assumptions. This implies that
patent antitrust rules, from substantive law to proof standards, should tilt generally
in favor of patentees.
16570 U.S. 136 (2013).
17Another example of the choice over how to implement the legal standard is observed in the area
of predatory innovation claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization.
The choice here is between the rule of reason test described in United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34
(D.C. Cir. 2001), or the innovator-favoring version of the test articulated, specifically for predatory
innovation claims, in Allied Orthopedic v. Tyco Healthcare, 592 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010).
47
Chapter 3
Optimal Contracts with Personal Agenda
3.1 Introduction
Ever since Schumpeter (1911, 1943), the critical role of innovation has been recognized
by economists, and hence, innovation, as a research topic, has received substantial
attention in the economics literature. Among the extensive study on innovations, one
important research question is how to manage innovations within organizations. It
is not just about the incentive to exert sufficient efforts to innovate, but also about
which innovation project is worth exploring with costly efforts. This paper studies the
contracting problem between a firm and its in-house researcher on innovation project
implementations over time.
As is pointed out in the existing literature, innovation is associated with uncer-
tainty (Manso, 2011). A high-tech firm can issue a patent for a successful innovation
project but not for a failing one. Under many circumstances, the high-tech firm
and its in-house researchers gradually learn how likely a project can succeed during
its execution.1 While the firm gets revenue generated from the patent granted to a
successful innovation, the researcher employed by the firm cannot. Instead, she gets
paid by the firm, as well as accumulating project-specific experience. Her experi-
ence can turn into human capital payoffs earned outside the firm. For example, a
Google software engineer can earn part-time earning from a crowd-sourcing platform
like uTest.com. The hourly rate of part-time earning depends on her experience. An
expert with extensive experience earns more than a novice. Hence, the researcher has
incentives to accumulate project-specific experience besides getting wage and bonus
from the firm. The researcher’s outside earning depends on her project-specific expe-
rience, whereas the firm’s payoff relies on the project being successful. This creates
1This is called experimentation in the existing literature.
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incentive conflict between the two parties.
Consider an example with two risky innovation projects, a radical innovation
and an incremental one. The radical innovation has a higher market value and a
smaller chance of success than the incremental innovation. If the extra market value
is not worth the extra riskiness, the firm prefers the incremental innovation project
over the radical one. The researcher’s earning from a part-time job depends only
on her experience, instead of the market value of the patent associated with the
innovation project. The different determining factors leads to misalignment of the
two players’ incentives. They can prefer the same project under one circumstance
but not another. This type of incentive conflicts affects the design of innovation
contract and the management of innovations within organizations.
This paper takes this type of incentive conflict into a two-period model with one
principal and one agent. The model considers both experimentation and human
capital accumulation. Experimentation means that the project’s chance to succeed
is learned through execution. The firm can gets positive monetary payoffs from
successful innovations. The agent gets human capital payoff outside the firm. The
human capital payoff is independent of the uncertainty and depends only on her
project-specific experience. The human capital payoff affects the incentive cost in
the contracting problem of experimentation and thus the resulting optimal contract
features. Two numerical examples of the model is developed to examine the features
of optimal contracts and how it depends on the human capital payoffs. Two set of
parameters of human capital payoffs are considered. If the human capital payoffs are
high, the optimal contract is pooling. This is consistent with the flat-wage scheme
that is often observed for scientists in non-profit institutions. If the human capital
payoffs are low, the optimal contract is separating. This provides an explanation of
performance-based contracts for innovators and scientists in high-tech industries.
3.2 Illustrative Model: Setup and Numerical Examples
This section first describes the model. Then the second part of this section introduces
the parameter values in the examples.
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3.2.1 Overview of Economic Environment
A principal employs an agent to implement R&D projects. There are two periods in
the model. Both players are risk neutral and share the same discount factor δ.
Production Technology and Principal’s Payoffs. There are three projects
available, denoted as α, β, σ. At each period, only one project is implemented. The
implemented project generates a project payoff at the end of that period. One ex-
ample of the project’s payoff is the revenue generated by a patent granted to an
innovation. Project σ is a safe project that always generates a constant positive
payoff at each implementation. Project α and β are both risky projects and their
production technologies are similar. Below I describe the production technology of α
in detail.
The project α can either be good or bad. Both the principal and the agent
are initially uncertain about it. Only through project implementation, can they
learn whether it is good. Only a good project can generate a success. If α is bad,
implementing it certainly generates a failure. If it is good, a success arrives with
probability λα ∈ (0, 1). At each success, each α implementation yields a positive
fixed amount of payoff. Assume the prior of α being good is θα ∈ (0, 1). Then
the probability that α succeeds at its first attempt is λαθα. If it fails at the first
attempt, the belief of α being good is updated via Bayes rule. Project β’s production
technology is similar. The priors of β being good is θβ . If project β is good, the
probability for β to succeed is λβ.
Agent’s Human Capital Payoff. The agent gets human capital payoffs from ac-
cumulating experience in risky project implementations. She gets zero from executing
the safe project. The agent’s payoffs from her experience in risky projects are inde-
pendent of whether the project succeeds or not, i.e., her human capital payoffs are
deterministic. Assume the agent gets zero human capital return from the first imple-
mentation of α, and gets human capital payoff A > 0 from the second implementation
of α. The agent gets a fixed positive amount of human capital payoff from project β
implementation. Formally, each period when β is implemented, the agent gets payoff
B, where 0 < B < A. The parameter values of all the parameters determining the
agent and the principal’s payoffs are given in the next section.
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Agent Principal
First attempt Second attempt Success Failure
α 0 A Rα 0
β B B Rβ 0
σ 0 0 Rσ Rσ
Table 3.1: Payoff Parameters
Summary of Assumptions on Payoffs The principal gets project payoffs, which
depend on whether the implemented project succeeds or fails. The agent gets deter-
ministic human capital payoff. The human capital payoff from project α depends on
project experience. Table 3.1 summarizes the payoff structure. A,B are the agent’s
payoff. Rα, Rβ,, Rσ are the principal’s payoffs, where Rα > 0, Rβ, > 0 denote the
success payoffs generated by project α and project β.
Contracting Environment. The agent has private information about the α’s suc-
cess payoffs, which is defined as her type. Assume the agent has two types, which
means two values of α’s success payoffs. The higher one is denoted as Rα,H , and the
lower one is denoted as Rα,L. The principal only knows the frequencies of the two
values. Assume the principal’s prior over the agent’s type being Rα,H is 0.5.
Assume that the principal does not observe the payoffs until the end of the second
period. Assume full commitment power for the two contracting parties and all actions
and project outcomes are verifiable. The following example focuses on the optimal
direct mechanism, where the agent reports her type, and the optimal contract specifies
a monetary transfer and a project choice plan to each type of the agent. An action
plan in the contract specifies the project to implement in period 1 and the project
choice in period 2 contingent on the project outcome in period 1. Similarly, the
monetary transfer is based on the sequence of actions and project payoffs. Assume
that the principal can only give non-negative transfer to the agent. The agent reports
her type, implements the project choice following the principal’s instruction, and gets
the outcome-based money transfer based on her report. Assume the agent cannot
deviate from the project choice function instructed by the principal.
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Principal’s Parameters Frequency of Types
Rα,H Rα,L Rβ Rσ δ λα λβ θα θβ ρ 1− ρ
20 14.5 8 0.85 0.8 0.5 0.55 0.2 0.51 0.5 0.5









(b) Small Human Capital Payoff
Case
Table 3.3: Parameters of Agent’s Payoffs
3.2.2 Examples and Parameter Values
The following analysis focuses on how the agent’s human capital payoff affects the
features of the optimal contract. In what follows, I present two numerical examples.
In both examples, the parameters affecting the principal’s payoffs are the same (Table
3.2). The first example considers a case in which the agent’s human capital payoffs,
A and B, are large (Table 3.3(a)). In the second example, A and B are small (Table
3.3(b)).
Then I assume two sets of human capital payoffs to show how human capital
payoffs affect the contracting problem. The example with larger values of the agent’s
human capital payoffs, A and B, is call the large-human-capital-payoff-case, whereas
the other one is called the small-human-capital-payoff case.
3.3 Principal’s Optimization Problem under Symmetric Information
This section studies the symmetric information benchmark. The principal gets stochas-
tic payoffs from project experimentation. The success probabilities affects her pay-
offs, thus, the project choice in period 2 depends on the project outcome real-
ized at the end of period 1. In particular, the project choice in period 2 can dif-
fer depending on whether a success is realized at the end of period 1. Therefore,
an action plan specifies the project choice implemented in period 1, the contin-
gent period-2 project choice upon observing a success and upon observing a fail-
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ure at the end of period 1.2 In the following analysis, an action plan is written
in shorthand as a three-letter phrase. For example, the action plan ααβ speci-
fies that the agent should do α in period 1, continue implementing α, if it suc-
ceeds and switch to β, if α fails in period 1. The set of action plans starting
with experimentation of a risky project includes ααα, ααβ, αβα, αββ, αασ, αβσ, ασα,
ασβ, ασσ, βαα, βαβ, ββα, βββ, βασ, ββσ, βσβ, βσα, βσσ. Note that a success and
a failure are defined only for risky projects. Therefore, for the action plans starting
with the safe project in period 1, there is no success or failure properly defined at
the end of period 1. Hence, the action plans starting with doing the safe project is
period 1 are written as a two-letter phrase. The set of action plans doing project σ in
period is {σα, σβ, σσ}, where σα means doing the safe project in period 1 and doing
the project α in period 2.
3.3.1 Principal’s Expected Utility and Optimal Action Plans
In this section, assume no information asymmetry. That is, both the agent and the
principal know project α’s success payoff. Thus, the optimal action plan is as if the
principal carries out the experimentation on her own. Let UPH(a) denote the principal’s
expected utility under action plan a, if α’s success payoff is Rα,H . Similarly defined
UPL(a).
For an action plan with a risky project implemented in period 1, the principal’s
expected utility of that action plan is composed of three parts, the instantaneous
utility obtained in period 1, the utility in period 2 by carrying out the project choice
contingent on a success in period 1, and the utility in period 2 by carrying out the
project choice contingent on a failure in period 1.
As an illustration, below describe how to compute the principal’s expected utility
under Rα,H . Take the expected utility over the action plan ααβ as an example. Given
the success payoff of α being Rα,H , the principal’s expected utility of (ααβ) is given
2If the safe project is implemented in period 1, there is no success or failure in period 1. Hence,
the action plan is consisted of project choice in period 1 and in period 2.
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by
UPH(ααβ) =λαθαRα,H + δλαθα(λαRα,H) + δ(1− λαθα)(λβθβRβ)
=0.5× 0.2× 20 + 0.8× 0.5× 0.2× (0.5× 20)
+ 0.8× (1− 0.5× 0.2) (0.55× 0.51× 8)
=4.416
For other action plans implementing a risky project in period 1, the principal’s
expected utility is computed in the same way.
For the action plans implementing the safe project in period 1, the principal’s
expected utility is consisted of two components, the utility obtained in period 1 and
period 2. Take the expected utility of action σβ as an example. UPH(σβ) is given by
UP(σβ) =Rσ + δλβθβRβ
=0.85 + 0.8× 0.55× 0.51× 8
=2.645
The expected utilities of other actions plans are computed similarly. Table 3.4 below
shows the expected utilities for all action plans under both values of α’s success payoff.
One column lists the expected utility under one value of α’s success payoff. Given
the value of α′s success payoff, the optimal action plan is the one yielding the largest
value in that column. Claim 1 below formally states the optimal action plan under
Rα,H and Rα,L.
Claim 1: Principal’s Optimal Action Plan under Symmetric Information
Under symmetric information benchmark, the principal’s optimal action plan is aPH =
(ααβ), if project α’s success payoff is 20. The optimal action plan is aPL = (ββα), if
project α’s success payoff is 14.5.
In words, if α’s success payoff is Rα,H , the principal prefers experimenting α first,
continuing it upon success and switching to project β upon failure. Under Rα,L, it



























Table 3.4: Principal’s Expected Utility: Symmetric Information
Notes: This table reports the principal’s expected utility of each action plan as if the princi-
pal knows the agent’s private information. The column of UPH shows the principal’s expected
utility when project α’s success payoff is Rα,H ; while the one of UPL represents the utilities
when the success payoff is Rα,L.
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3.4 Optimal Contracts
This section studies the optimal contract of the problems with the numerical values
introduced in the previous section. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the direct
mechanism, in which the principal offers each type an action plan and non-negative
monetary transfers. The agent reports her type and implements the instructed action
plan, as well as getting the non-negative monetary transfer based on outcome and
action, as specified in the contract.
Let aĤ denote the action plan instructed to the agent reporting high type. Sim-
ilarly define aL̂.
3 UPn (·) denotes the principal’s expected utility where the subscript
denotes the type n ∈ {H,L} indicating which value of α’s success payoff is used in
this expected utility.4 Let M(n, n̂) denote the discounted sum of monetary transfer,
if the agent of type n reports her type as n̂. The contracting problem in the example











s.t UA(aĤ) +M(H, Ĥ) ≥ U
A(aL̂) +M(H, L̂) (3.1)
UA(aL̂) +M(L, L̂) ≥U
A(aĤ) +M(L, Ĥ) (3.2)
where the subscript n̂ ∈ {H,L} denotes the agent’s report at the beginning, and the
subscript n ∈ {H,L} denote the true type.5
UA(an̂) denotes the agent’s expected total human capital payoffs generated by
implementing the action plan an̂. Note that UA(·) does not depend on the agent’s
type because the agent’s payoffs do not depend on project successes or failures. Below
I use an example to describe how to compute the agent’s total human capital payoff.
Take action plan ββα as an example. The agent’s total human capital payoff of doing
this action is denoted as UA(ββα). The agent’s total human capital payoffs depend
3The following paragraphs abuse notation and write aH and aL as the action plan instructed to
the high type and the low type.
4The expression of the principal’s expected utility is the same as in the proceeding analysis of
the symmetric information benchmark
5UPn(an̂) denotes the principal’s expected total project payoff if type n agent carries out action
plan an̂.
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on the parametric values of A,B. Hence, she has different expected utilities under the
two cases. Under the large-human-capital-payoff case, A = 0.3 and B = 0.1. Thus,
UA(ββα) in the large-human-capital-payoff case is given by
UA(ββα) =B + δ [λβθβB + (1− λβθβ)× 0]
=1 + 0.8× [(0.55× 0.51)× 1 + (1− 0.55× 0.51)× 0]
=1.224.
3.4.1 Computation for Deriving the Optimal Contract
This section sketches how to solve the contracting problem. The principal can offer a
separating contract or a pooling contract. In what follows, I first compute the prin-
cipal’s net expected utility from separation for each pair of action plans. The action
plan, and the corresponding monetary transfers, that generates the highest net utility
to the principal is the best separating contract. I then calculate the principal’s net
utility from offering a pooling contract for each action plan. The one that generates
the highest net utility is the best pooling contract. Comparing the best separating
contract and the best pooling contract, the better of these two is the optimal contract
of the problem.
3.4.1.1 Computation of Expected Utility from Separation
In the calculation of the principal’s net utility from separation, there are three steps.
1. For each pair of action plans, I compute the principal’s expected utility without
considering the monetary transfers to satisfy the incentive constraints.
2. The second step is to consider the discounted sum of monetary transfer. Be-
cause the monetary transfer is to compensate for the type of agent getting the less
favorable action plan, the discounted sum of monetary transfer equals to the agent’s
expected utility difference in two action plans. This step is to calculate the agent’s
expected utility difference in any two action plans
3. I subtract results in the first step with the result in the second step. Then I
have the principal’s net utility in implementing each pair of action plans.
Step 1: Expected Utility from Separation without Monetary Transfers
The first steps calculates the principal’s expected total utility under separation with-
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out the deduction of monetary transfer. The computation is carried out for each
possible pair of action plans. Given each pair of action plans, there are two possi-
bilities for the principal’s instruction, depending on which action plan the high type
should follow. I compute the principal’s expected utility under each possible instruc-
tion and then compare. The larger value in the two expected utilities is reported as
the expected utility of this pair of action plan. The reason behind this calculation
is that the amount of expected total monetary transfer depends only on the action
plans in the pair, not how to assign the action plan to the types. Therefore, the job
assignment yielding a lower expected utility is never the equilibrium action. More
details of this reasoning is also discussed in the next section when the total amount
of monetary transfer is computed.
Here I use an example to describe how to compute the principal’s expected utility
of an action plan pair. Take the pair (ααα, ααβ) for example. Given this pair
of action plans, there are two possible job assignments, instructing the high type
to implement (ααα) or the the low type implement (ααα), i.e., (aH = ααα, aL =
ααβ) or (aH = ααβ, aL = ααα). Let V sep(ααα, ααβ) denote the value reported as
the expected utility under this action plan pair, then V sep(ααα, ααβ) is given by6














= max {0.5 [3.6 + 2.196] ,0.5 [4.416 + 2.610]}
= max {2.898,3.513}
=3.513
The values in the second equality, UPH(ααα) = 3.6, UPL(ααβ)=2.196, UPH(ααβ) =
4.416 and UPL(ααα) = 2.610, is from the results of the principal’s expected utility un-
der the symmetric benchmark in Table 3.4. The expected utilities without monetary
transfer are summarized in Table 3.9.
Step 2: Expected Total Monetary Transfer If the principal instructs two
different action plans to the two types, the agent gets different expected utility from
the two job assignments. Hence, the expected total monetary transfer is to com-
pensate the agent’s expected utility difference, in particular, to the agent type with
6where UPH(·) and UPL(·) are the principal’s expected utility of an action plan under symmetric
information benchmark under the high type and low type, respectively.
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less favorable job assignment. In the optimal contract, the expected total monetary
transfer equals to the agent’s expected utility difference.
As a result, computing the expected total monetary transfer in this step is to
calculate the agent’s expected utility difference in each pair of action plans. For
example, the expected total monetary transfer computed for the action plan pair
(ααα, ααβ) is the agent’s expected utility difference in carrying out the action plan
(ααα) and the action plan (ααβ), i.e., |UA(ααα) − UA(ααβ)|. As an example, I
calculates |UA(ααα) − UA(ααβ)| under the large-human-capital-payoff case, where
A = 3 and B = 1.
|UA(ααα)− UA(ααβ)| = |δA− [0 + δ (θαλαA+ (1− θαλα)B)]|
= |δA− δ (θαλαA+ (1− θαλα)B)|
= |0.8× 3− 0.8× (0.5× 0.2× 3 + (1− 0.5× 0.2)× 1)|
=1.44
Different values of A, B, the human capital payoffs, lead to different expected
utility difference. Hence, the expected utility difference. Table 3.10 summarizes the
expected utility difference under the large-human-capital-payoff case. Table 3.11 is
the calculation for the small-human-capital-payoff case.
From the calculation above, one can also see that the expected total monetary
transfer in the optimal contract only depends on the action plans in the pair, instead
of the particular job assignment. For example, the expected total monetary transfer
under the job assignment of the high type doing (ααα) and the low type doing (ααβ)
equals to that under the alternative assignment of switching the instruction, i.e., aH =
(ααβ) and aL = (ααα), because under both assignments, the expected total monetary
transfer equals to the agent’s expected utility difference, |UA(ααα)− UA(ααβ)|.
Step 3: Net Expected Utility after Subtracting Monetary Transfer
With the results in the previous two steps, one can compute the net expected utility
of each pair of action plans. The net expected utility of an action plan pair is the
principal’s expected utility from this pair (Step 1) net the expected total monetary
transfer (Step 2).
Again, take the action plan (ααα, ααβ) under the large-human-capital-payoff case
as an example as an illustration. Let V net(ααα, ααβ) denote the net utility under
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separation, and V net(ααα, ααβ) is given by

















= max {0.5× 3.6 + 0.5× 2.196− 0.5× 1.44 ,
0.5× 4.416 + 0.5× 2.61− 0.5× 1.44}
= max {2.178, 2.793}
=2.793
where the expected utilities UPH(·), UPL(·) are summarized in Table 3.4. The expected
utility difference |UA(ααα) − UA(ααβ)| is computed in the previous step and listed
in Table 3.10 for the large-human-capital-payoff case and in Table 3.11 for the small-
human-capital-payoff case.
The net expected utility from separation for all pairs of action plans under the
large-human-capital-payoff case is in Table 3.12 in the appendix. The net utility
from separation under the small-human-capital-payoff case is in Table 3.13. The best
separating contract in each case is the one with the highest value in the each of
these two tables. According to Table 3.12, the principal’s highest net expected utility
under the large-human-capital-payoff case is 4.109, which is generated by the pair
of action plans (ααβ;ββα). From Table 3.13, the principal’s maximal net expected
utility under the small-human-capital-payoff case is 4.24, also generated by the action
plan pair (ααβ;ββα).7
3.4.1.2 Expected Utility from Pooling
Now consider the principal’s expected total utility under pooling. According to the
incentive compatibility constraints in (3.1) and (3.2), it is not hard to see that, if
the principal instructs both types to implement the same actions plan, the monetary
transfer to both types is zero in the optimal contract, regardless of time or state.
Hence, the expected utility from pooling depends only on the production technology
of project experimentation without the necessity to consider the agent’s human capital
7The pair (ααβ;ββα) is also the principal’s optimal pair of action plans under the symmetric
information benchmark. The best action plan pair under separation coincides with that under the
symmetric information, because the difference in the agent’s human capital payoffs from the two
projects is not large with regard to the difference between the success payoffs of two risky projects.
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payoffs.
In this section, I calculate the principal’s expected utility from pooling at each
action plan. The principal’s expected utility is the average of the principal’s expected
utility of implementing that action plan under the high type’s success payoff and the
low type’s.. Let Upool(a) denote her ex-ante utility if instructing the agent to take







For example, if the principal instructs both types to implement ββα,the principal’s







=0.5 [λβθβRβ + δλβθβ(λβRβ) + δ(1− λβθβ)(λαθαRα,H)
+ λβθβRβ + δλβθβ(λβRβ) + δ(1− λβθβ)(λαθαRα,L)]
=λβθβRβ + δλβθβ(λβRβ) + δ(1− λβθβ)λαθα (0.5Rα,H + 0.5Rα,L)
= (0.55× 0.51)× 8 + 0.8× 0.55× 0.51× 0.55× 8
+ 0.8× (1− 0.55× 0.51)× 0.5× 0.2× 0.5× (20 + 14.5)
=4.224
Other expected utility from pooling is computed similarly. Table 3.8 lists the
principal’s expected utility from pooling for each action plan.
The action plan yielding the largest pooling utility to the principal is the one with
the highest value in Table 3.8. From Table 3.8, the action plan (ββα) generates the
maximal expected utility under pooling, which equals 4.224. Note that the principal’s
expected utility under pooling does not depend on the agent’s human capital payoffs,
because she does not have to pay positive monetary transfer under pooling to satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraints.
61
3.4.1.3 Summary of Computation Procedure and Final Comparison to
Find Optimal Contract
In the previous two sections, the expected utility from separation and pooling is
computed for each pair of action plans. Then in the final step, the highest expected
utility from pooling is compared with the maximal net utility from separation. To find
the optimal contract under the large-human-capital-payoff case, compare the highest
value of the principal’s net utility from separation in Table 3.12 to the maximum in
Table 3.8, which lists all expected utilities from pooling. For the equilibrium action
plan pair in the small-human-capital case, I compare the maximum in Table 3.13 to
that in Table 3.8.
3.4.2 Optimal Contract in Two Cases
To solve for the optimal contract in both the large- and the small-human-capital-
payoff cases, I compare the best separating contract (Section 3.4.1.1) and the best
pooling contract (Section 3.4.1.2) in each of the two cases. I summarize the results
in the following two claims and discuss the intuition and implications of the optimal
contracts.
Claim 2 Under the large human capital case, the optimal contract is pooling such
that (i) the monetary transfer is zero; (ii) the project choice a∗ is ββα. The principal’s
expected utility is 4.224.
In the large-human-capital-payoff case, as seen in Table 3.12, the largest net ex-
pected utility under a separating contract is 4.109, generated by the action plan pair
(αββ;ββα). From Table 3.8, the principal’s largest expected utility from pooling is
4.224, which is generated by the action plan (ββα). Because of 4.224 > 4.109, the
optimal contract is pooling, and both types should implement the action plan (ββα).
In the optimal contract, the principal does not pay to either type of agent.
Claim 3 Under the small human capital scenario, the optimal contract is separating
such that
(i) the high type gets the positive monetary transfers with a total discounted value
equal to 0.027;
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(ii) the pair of action plans is the high type implements the action plan ααβ and
the low type implements ββα, i.e., the same as the principal’s optimal one under the
symmetric information benchmark.
(iii) In the optimal contract, the principal’s expected utility is 4.227, after netting
out the monetary transfers.
In the small-human-capital-payoff case, as seen in Table 3.12, the largest net
expected utility under a separating contract is 4.227, generated by the action plan
pair (αββ,ββα). From Table 3.8, the principal’s largest expected utility from pooling
is 4.224, which is generated by the action plan (ββα). Because of 4.224 < 4.227, the
optimal contract is separating and the pair of action plan in the optimal contract is
(αββ,ββα).
To determine the exact job assignment, one can check the principal’s expected
utility for each possible job assignment, i.e., the assignment with the high type doing
(αββ) versus the one with the low type doing (αββ). As illustrated in the first step
of calculation of expected utility from separation, the expected utility derived from
the project payoffs generated by the action plan pair (ααβ, ββα) is given by














= max {0.5 [4.416 + 4.066] ,0.5 [4.383 + 2.196]}
=4.241
where the result 4.241euquals to 0.5 [4.416 + 4.066], which means the job assignment
of instructing the high type to do ααβ and the low type to do ββα yields the higher
expected utility to the principal than switching the order of the assignment. Because
the amount of expected total monetary transfer is the same for both assignments, the
assignment of the high type doing ααβ and the low type doing ββα is the equilibrium
instruction in the optimal contract.8
Which type to get the positive monetary transfer is solved by checking the agent’s
expected utility of the action plan ααβ and of the action plan ββα. Under this small-
human-capital-payoff case, A = 0.03, B = 0.01. The two expected utilities are given
8V sep(ααβ, ββα) = 4.241 is consistent with the result in Table 3.9 which summarizes the princi-
pal’s maximal expected utility between the two action plans in a fixed pair. For the pair (ααβ, ββα),
the principal’s expected gross payoffs amounting to 4.241.
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by
UA(ααβ) =0 + δ (θαλαA+ (1− θαλα)B)
=δ (θαλαA+ (1− θαλα)B)
=0.8× [0.5× 0.2× 0.03 + (1− 0.5× 0.2)× 0.01]
=0.0096,
and,
UA(ββα) =B + δ [λβθβB + (1− λβθβ)× 0]
=0.01 + 0.8× [(0.55× 0.51)× 0.01 + (1− 0.55× 0.51)× 0]
=0.0122
It is evident that UA(ααβ) < UA(ββα). The action plan ααβ is the job assign-
ment given the type of agent reporting high type, thus, the high type agent gets less
expected total human capital payoff. Therefore, the monetary transfer is given to the
high type.
Under the large-human-capital-payoff case, the high value of human capital pay-
offs result in a high incentive cost for separation, which is larger than the principal’s
gain from separation. Therefore, the principal is better off by assigning the same
action plan to both types of the same action plans without paying monetary trans-
fer to compensate for the incentive cost. Hence, the optimal contact features both
type pooling at the action plan ββα. This action plan starts experimentation with
project β which has a high chance to succeed but a lower success payoff and a smaller
long-term human capital payoff than project α. Under symmetric information, the
principal prefers the high type to do ααβ. The action plan ββα also generates a
smaller discounted sum of human capital payoff to the agent than ααβ does. Hence,
the equilibrium in this example features an action plan sub-optimal for both players.
In this paper, the project β and project α represents, respectively, an incremental
and a radical innovation project. The equilibrium in this example demonstrates that
the high level of human capital payoffs resulting in high incentive cost leads to an
increased priority of the incremental innovation project. Despite higher short-term
human capital payoff to the agent and less risk exposure to the principal, the incre-
mental innovation project generates a lower level of long-run human capital payoff to
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the agent. The incremental innovation project, modeled as project β in this frame-
work, gets a higher priority, whereas the priority of the radical innovation decreases.
Patents of radical innovations usually are valued much larger than the incremental
innovations, and play a more critical role in the long-term development of high-tech
firms. In this sense, the principal’s long-term benefit is worse under the optimal
contract than under the symmetric information benchmark.
Under the small-human-capital-payoff case, the optimal contract is separating, and
the principal implements her most preferred pair of action plans. She instructs the
high type agent to implement the action plan ααβ, which generates a smaller value of
total human capital payoff to the agent than the action plan instructed to the low type.
In the optimal contract, the high type is assigned with a less favorable action plan
than the low type, and is compensated by a positive monetary transfer. The better
job assignment given to the low type is a form of non-monetary incentive. The low
type’s job assignment aligns better with the human capital accumulation incentive,
motivating her to stick to her task, despite the less monetary compensation in the
low type’s contract.. The combination of the monetary incentive and non-monetary
incentive under this case sheds new light on the different wage schemes given to the
scientists employed by firms and by non-profit organizations. The scientists employed
by firms often carry out R&D projects optimal to her employing firm’s interest at
the expense of less aligning with their personal career goals. They earn high wages
to compensate for this misalignment. On the other hand, scientists in non-profit
organizations can carry out research activities with a better fit for their own career
goal, while earning less, and often times, flatter wages than scientists employed in
firms.
3.5 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper examines the incentive conflicts between the principal and the agent of a
contracting problem under hidden information. The examples given in the analysis
consider both learning from experimentation and the agent’s human capital accumula-
tion motive. The agent’s human capital payoff depends on her project experience, and
the principal’s payoff from the projects depends on the uncertainty learned through
experimentation. The different determining factors create an incentive conflict be-
tween the two players. The features of optimal contracts in the numerical examples
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offer a novel perspective to explain several phenomena in innovation literature.
The illustrative model has several limitations. The most obvious one is the the
full commitment assumption. It is not a realistic assumption and hence should be




A.1.1 Proof of proposition 1.1
Proposition 1.1 The host’s average rating on Airbnb is positively related to her









is the average rating of the host.
Proof : We solve the subgame equilibrium at Period 2. Note that at Period 2, both
players choose their optimal effort level as best response to the other’s effort. Then
each player reports their utility of accommodation in the rating.
Plugging rh,i(ei, eh) = vh + αiu(ei, eh) and ri(ei, eh) = vi + αhu(ei, eh) into the
ex-post utility of host and guest i, we have
Ui(ei|eh) = max
ei
{vh + αiu(ei, eh)− P − C(ei) + βi[vi + αhu(ei, eh)]}, (3.5)
Uh(eh|ei) = max
eh
{vi + αhu(ei, eh) + βh[vh + αiu(ei, eh)]}. (3.6)
Combining the first order conditions of the two optimality problems, we have
e∗i = A(αh + βhαi)
1−k




e∗h = B(αh + βhαi)
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= vh + αi[A(αh + βhαi)
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A.1.2 Proof of proposition 1.2
Proposition 1.2 The ratings on both review systems depend positively on the weights
of reciprocity and reputation, αh and βh. However, given the same pool of guests, the
host’s average rating on Airbnb responds more to the reciprocity weight, while the
















rairh,i (eh, ei)di is the host’s average rating on Airbnb, and Runi ≡∫
i
runih,i (eh, ei)di is the host’s average rating on an unilateral review system.
Proof : From previous results, we have
e∗i = A(αh + βhαi)
1−k
2 (αi + βiαh)
1+k
2
e∗h = B(αh + βhαi)
1− k
2 (αi + βiαh)
k
2 .
For the same host and the same guests pool on both the unilateral review system
platform and Airbnb, and given identical values of the parameters, except βi = 0


















rairh,i (eh, ei)di and Runi ≡
∫
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Thus, under a unilateral reputation system, hosts that care more about reputation
are ranked higher than hosts that care more about the shared experience utility. The
opposite is true on bilateral reputation systems like Airbnb.9 Q.E.D.
A.1.3 Proof of proposition 1.3
Proposition 1.3 On Airbnb, prices increase after a positive shock on ratings, and
decrease after a negative shock on ratings. Given the same price P1 at period 1, and
ratings Rairbnb and R′airbnb disclosed at period 2, we have the following relationship for
prices posted at period 3,
if Rairbnb > R
′
airbnb then P3(Rairbnb) > P3(R
′
airbnb). (3.15)
Proof : Ex-ante, guests determine whether to enter the market according to Vi(P ).
Guest i enters the market if and only if Vi(P ) ≥ 0, given P . Therefore, the marginal
guest is guest i∗ where Vi∗(P ) = 0. For each guest i at period 3, the expected utility
Vi(P ) is positively determined by her inference of αh, βh.
From previous results, we have ∂u(ei,eh)
∂αh
> 0 and ∂u(ei,eh)
∂βh
> 0. Together with







9An alternative and equivalent way to prove proposition 1.2 would be to remove the term βiri
from the ex-post utility of guest i in equations 3.5 and then solving the optimization problems of
the host and the guest. The resulting effort levels are the equilibrium effort levels in unilateral rating
system.
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Then, since Ui(ei, eh, ri, vh) = vh + αiu(ei, eh) + βiri, we have that ∀(αi, βi) > 0,
∂Ui(ei, eh, ri, vh)
∂αh
> 0, (3.18)
∂Ui(ei, eh, ri, vh)
∂βh
> 0, (3.19)
where u(ei, eh) is the shared experience utility and Ui(ei, eh, ri) is ex-post utility of
guest i during the accommodation stay.
At period 3, Vi(P3) is the ex-ante utility of the guest i if she decides to transact
with the host. The guest i forms her expectation based on the publicly observed





Ui(ei, eh, ri, vh)dF
updated(Ψh), (3.20)
where F updated(Ψh) is the posterior distribution of the host’s characteristic parameter
vector (αh, βh, vh). The Bayesian-updated guests update the prior distribution F (Ψh)
upon the signal Rh to derive F updated(Ψh) .
From Equations 3.18, 3.19, and 3.20, we have that ∀(αh, βh, vh) ∈ Ψh, the ex-







The two conditions above imply that the ex-ante utility to transact is higher if the host
is perceived to have higher weight on shared experience or reputation respectively.







Conditions 3.23 and 3.24 show that the hosts with higher value of αh and βh have
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higher rating rh,i given the same guest i. Then, from Rh ≡
∫
rh,idi, we have that,
given the same guests pool, the average rating, Rh, reveals higher value of (αh, βh).
Suppose that two hosts are identical, except for their ratings, i.e., they have the
same price P1, same location, and similar property, but Rairbnb > R′airbnb. Then the
higher rating Rairbnb is a positive signal relative to R′airbnb, i.e., the expected value of
the host’s characteristics is better for the host with Rairbnb. Thus, if the two hosts
post identical P3, the expected demand towards the host with higher average ratings
would be higher, i.e., Q(P3, Rairbnb) > Q(P3, R′airbnb).
Since each period-3 guest is more willing to transact with a host having Rairbnb
than with a host having R′airbnb, the host with higher rating posts higher price P3 in
this monopolistic pricing setting (assuming that the hosts are faced with the same
pool of guests).
Formally, let’s suppose P1 and Q1 are the same for Host A and Host B, and, with-
out loss of generality, assume the mass of guests enter the market have the same set of
parameters, (αi, βi). Let the Host A have an average rating Rairbnb and Host B an av-
erage rating R′airbnb. If Rairbnb > R′airbnb, then from Equation 3.16 and Equation 3.17,
we have at least one of the following conditions holds:
αA > αB,
βA > βB.
Then, for any positive P3,
Vi(transact with A|P3) > Vi(transact with B|P3) (3.25)
The marginal guest is defined as the one with Vi(transact|P3, Rairbnb) = 0. Then,
from Equation 3.25, we know that the marginal guest transacting with Host A can
bear a higher P3 compared to that trading with Host B, since Host A is expected to
have higher value of α or β or both.







h, rh,i)dF (Ψg)}, (3.26)
we have that, given that Ψg is the same for Host A and B, P3(Rairbnb) > P3(R′airbnb).
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A.1.4 Relaxing the truth-telling assumption
As defined in Section 1.3.3, we have that
rh,i ≡ φ(vh + u(ei, eh)). (3.27)





φ(vh + u(ei, eh))di. (3.28)
Now, assume all hosts are faced with an identical pool of guests. Let ωi ≡ vh+u(ei, eh).








The inequality is strict for some ωi.
From the Equations 3.29 and 3.30, we have ∂φ(ωi)
∂αh
≥ 0 and the inequality is strict




Proof of Proposition 1.4
Proposition 1.4 Assume the distribution of θi is independent of the distribution of









where i sort in and i′ sort out.
Proof : The ex-post utility of the guest i at accommodation stage is given by
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Ui(ei|eh) = vh + αiu(ei, eh)− P − C(ei) + βiri (3.33)
+ 1{rating}[−γi|vi(ei, eh)− rh,i|],
where 1{rating} = 1 iff rh,i > θi, (3.34)
where vi(ei, eh) ≡ uh + αiu(ei, eh) From maxrh,i [−γi|vi(ei, eh) − rh,i|], we know that,
for those guests i selecting in to give ratings, rh,i = vi(ei, eh); i.e., if vi(ei, eh) > θi,
1{rating} = 1.
Therefore, for those guests i′ who select out (or, sort out) in ratings, vi(ei, eh) < θi
and those selecting to disclose ratings have vi(ei, eh) ≥ θi. Then, the average utility




























From equation3.34, we have:
If the guest i selects to disclose a rating, the optimality condition for the choice




Thus, r∗h,i = vi(ei, eh)
Thus, the optimality problem of the guest i who sort in is:
Ui(ei|eh) = max
ei
[vh + αiu(ei, eh)− P − C(ei) + βiri]
i.e., The optimality problem of choosing effort ei returns to that of baseline model.
Also, from the host’s perspective, she does not know the θi which is the private
information of the guest i. This assumption is not a strong one, considering the
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θicaptures the psychological cost showing the threshold for the guest i to sorting in.
Thus, the host makes decision based on the average level of θi , denoted as θ̄. Then,
the optimality problem of the host is given by:
Uh(eh|ei) = max
ch,i
[vh(ei, eh)− C(eh) + βhE[rh,i(ei, eh)|θ̄].
Two cases involved:
• If αhu(ei, eh) < θ̄ − vi, then, we have
Uh(eh|ei) = max
ch,i
[vi + u(ei, eh)− C(eh)],
Ui(ei|eh) = max
ei
[vh + αiu(ei, eh)− P − C(ei) + βi(vh + u(ei, eh))].
The First Order Conditions are given by:




)k−1 − ciei = 0.
Then, we have solutions
e∗outi = A(αh)
1−k
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k
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• If αhu(ei, eh) ≥ θ̄ − vi, the solutions are as before:
e∗ini = A(αh + βhαi)
1−k
2 (αi + βiαh)
1+k
2 ,
e∗inh = B(αh + βhαi)
1− k
2 (αi + βiαh)
k
2 ,
















2 . Under this case, the host
exerts the same level of efforts as the baseline case.
Note that e∗∗h = B(αh + βhαi)1−
k
2 (αi + βiαh)
k
2 , if and only if αhu(e∗ini , e∗inh ) ≥ θ̄ − vi




h }, i.e., the set I is the set of guests with whom the host exerts the level of
efforts same as that without selection. We have I ⊂ Q , where Q is the set of guests
entering the transaction in baseline model.








h)di, where vh(e∗i , e∗h) under the




We also have, for i ∈ I, vh(e∗i , e∗h) > vh(e∗i′ , e∗h,i′), where i′ ∈ Q \ I and vh(e∗i′ , e∗h,i′)
is the utility of the guest i′ in the baseline model.
















Proof of Proposition 1.5
Proposition 1.5 Assume the distribution of θi and β are independent of α, then
the average rating of the host on Airbnb is still positively correlated with her weight









is the average rating of the host
Proof : From previous results, we have:
If the guest i selects to disclose a rating, the optimality condition for the choice




Thus, r∗h,i = vi(ei, eh)
Thus, the optimality problem of the guest i who sort in is:
Ui(ei|eh) = max
ei
[vh + αiu(ei, eh)− P − C(ei) + βiri],
i.e., The optimality problem of choosing effort ei returns to that of baseline model.
Also, from the host’s perspective, she does not know the θi which is the private
75
information of the guest i. This assumption is not a strong one, considering the
θicaptures the psychological cost showing the threshold for the guest i to sorting in.
Thus, the host makes decision based on the average level of θi, denoted as θ̄. Then,
the optimality problem of the host is given by:
Uh(eh|ei) = max
ch,i
[vh(ei, eh)− C(eh) + βhE(rh,i(ei, eh)|θ̄)].
Two cases involved:
• If αhu(ei, eh) < θ̄ − vi, then, we have
Uh(eh|ei) = max
ch,i
[vi + u(ei, eh)− C(eh)],
Ui(ei|eh) = max
ei
[vh + αiu(ei, eh)− P − C(ei) + βi(vh + u(ei, eh))].
The First Order Conditions are given by:




)k−1 − ciei = 0.
Then, we have solutions
e∗i = A(αh)
1−k
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• If αhu(ei, eh) ≥ θ̄ − vi, the solutions are as before:
e∗i = A(αh + βhαi)
1−k
2 (αi + βiαh)
1+k
2 ,
e∗h = B(αh + βhαi)
1− k
2 (αi + βiαh)
k
2 .

















Since r∗h,i = vi(ei, eh) = vh + u(e∗i , e∗h), where αhu(e∗i , e∗h) ≥ θ̄ − vi and e∗i and e∗h are
given as above, we have
∂r∗h,i
∂αi
> 0. Since Rsort ≡
∫





Proof of Proposition 1.6
Proposition 1.6 Assume the distribution of θi and β are independent of α, then
price still increases with the ratings. Formally, given identical price P1 , price P2,
which is determined by the average rating Rsort, has the following property:
if Rsort > R̃sort, then P2(R
sort) > P2(R̃
sort),
where Rsort and R̃sort are two average ratings gained by the host under sorting of
ratings.







Thus, similar as the previous arguments in the proof in Proposition 3, if , Rsort > R̃sort





E[U sorti (ei|eh)|P ] > E[U sorti (ei|ẽh)|P ]. (3.37)
Then, with Bayesian updating of the late guests, we have P2(Rsort) > P2(R̃sort).
Q.E.D.
A.2 Alternative models
A.2.1 A Simple model
We start with a simple model where we assume the host to be a risk-neutral profit
maximizer. The service quality offered by the host is exogenously given and fixed
across transactions. Further, the service quality is private information of the host
and only revealed to the guests during their stay in the host’s property. The distri-
bution of service quality is common knowledge. We assume a monopolistic host and
a continuum of guests with heterogeneous tastes. The guests are located on a line
and the host is located at the center. The heterogeneous taste of guest i is modeled
as xi, which denotes the distance between the host and the guest i, and it follows a
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uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we assume the effort cost
of publishing a review is zero. The timing of the game is as follows:
• in Period 1, the host posts price P1 and a continuum of guests – the early guests
– enter the market. The early guests can only observe P1. As stated above, the
expected value of service quality, E[vh], is common knowledge. Guests decide
whether to request accommodation. The transaction volume for this set of
guests, Q1, is realized.
• in Period 2, the accommodation stay takes place. Service quality is now revealed
to the guest who requests the accommodation. The utility of guest i is vh− xi.
At the end of this period, the guest i publishes a rating rh,i for the host.
• in Period 3, the host observes the ratings received in period 2 and post a new
price P3. A continuum of guests – the late guests – enter the market. Their
heterogeneous taste parameter xi follows the same distribution of the early
guests. They observe the average rating for host h disclosed in Period 2 and
the price P3. They make their accommodation decision accordingly.
We assume that guests truthfully report their utility in the ratings, i.e., rh,i = vh−xi,
where vh denotes the service quality and xi denotes the heterogeneous taste of guest
i. We don’t consider this truthtelling assumption is a strong one here, since under
this scenario, an agent does not have incentive to collude with host in inflating rat-
ings. Meanwhile, if agents truthfully report service quality in the ratings, informative
ratings have value to other users on the platform. Thus, the truthtelling assumption
is justified by the phenomenon of “warm glow” discussed in Andreoni (1990).10
Moreover, we assume that the distribution of vh and xi is common knowledge and,
hence, E[vh] is known ex-ante to the guests and E[xi] is known ex-ante to the host.
In this setting, the only choice variable of the host is price. The objective function
of the host is given by:
Vh(P ) = max
P
{E[PQ− C(Q)|P ]}, (3.38)
where P denotes price and Q denotes the transaction volume. Vh(P ) denotes the
ex-ante utility contingent on choosing price P . Since the host is risk-neutral and only
10Note that since P1 is common knowledge, assuming rh,i = vh − xi or rh,i = vh − xi − P1 is
exactly the same for our analysis.
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interested in expected profits, the utility function coincides with expected profits.
Similarly, the only choice variable of a guest is whether to request accommodation.
A guest requests accommodation from the host if and only if her expected utility
from the accommodation is non-negative. The guest’s ex-ante utility prior to the
accommodation is given by:
Vi(transact|P ) = E[vh]− xi − P, (3.39)
where Vi(transact|P ) is the ex-ante utility of the guest i if she books the accommo-
dation. P denotes the price set by the host, vh denotes the service quality, and xi
denotes the heterogeneous taste of guest i. We assume xi to have uniform distribution
over [0, 1]).
After staying in the host’s property, the guest i publishes a rating rh,i = vh − xi.
The host’s rating R ≡
∫
rh,idi depends only on vh and E[vh], as E[vh] determines the
pool of guests requesting accommodation from the host.
In the solution below, we solve backwards for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Proof : In the first period, early guests make a decision based on E[vh] which
is common knowledge. When the host chooses P1, the marginal guest i∗ who is
indifferent about reserving the accommodation or not, is given by
E[vh]− xi∗ − P1 = 0. (3.40)
Guests with x ∈ [0, xi∗ ] book the accommodation. Hence, the first period transaction
volume is
Q1 = xi∗ = E[vh]− P1. (3.41)











Since both R and Q1 are common knowledge in Period 3, late guests can infer the
value of vh from vh = R + Q12 . Therefore, the marginal guest in Period 3 is given by
vh − xj∗ − P3 = 0, i.e.,
Q3 = xj∗ = vh − P3. (3.43)







{P3(vh − P3)}. (3.44)
From the first order condition (FOC), we have P ∗3 =
vh
2
. Then in Period 1,
assuming hosts discount future revenue at rate β, a host solves:
max
P1
{P1(E[vh]− P1) + βP ∗3 (vh − P ∗3 )}. (3.45)





Then from Equations 3.41 and 3.46, we have Q1 = E[vh]2 . Thus, we have







For a pool of hosts with vh ∈ [vh, v̄h], the average value of vh is E[vh], hence, the






Let Rc denote the rating casual hosts and Rp denote the rating of professional
hosts. For Rc to be systematically higher than Rp, we have to assume that the







h] denote the average service quality of casual
hosts and of professional hosts, respectively. Note that casual and professional hosts
differ in their market participation frequency. In this simple model, the service quality
of the host is not endogeneously chosen by the host, hence we lack a mechanism to
link a host’s market participation frequency with their ratings. Thus, in order for
E[vch] > E[v
p
h], we need to assume that market participation negatively correlates with
the exogenously given service quality. However, this does not seem to be a natural
assumption to make. As higher service quality can translate into higher ratings
which attracts future business, hosts choosing to participate more frequently should
not have less incentive to work hard towards achieving high ratings. If anything, this
rationale suggests that market participation frequency should be positively correlated
with service quality. We conclude that this simple model cannot easily explain why
professional hosts have lower ratings. Q.E.D.
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A.2.2 Relaxing the truth-telling assumption
Next, motivated by the observation that the guests who do not report ratings are
likely to have had a worse experience (Fradkin et al. 2017), we relax the truth-telling
assumption. In doing so, we allow selection bias in ratings. To allow for selection
bias, we assume that guests provide a rating to a host only if the rating is above a
threshold θi, i.e.,
1{rating} = 1 iff rh,i > θi. (3.48)
Then the ex-ante utility of the guest i in period 1 is given by
Vi(transact|P ) = E[vh]− xi − P + E[ri − 1{rating}αi|(vh − xi)− rh,i|], (3.49)
where rh,i denotes the rating guest i gives to the host, and ri denotes the rating the
host gives to the guest i. The term αi denotes the weight of the host’s reputation in
guest i’s utility.
Compared with the guest’s ex-post utility in the simple model (Equation 3.39),
the current utility function has two new parts. The first part includes 1{rating}|(vh−
xi) − rh,i| and the rating threshold θi. The difference between the disclosed rating
and the true level of the guest’s utility captures the guest’s disutility derived from
reporting a rating different from the true value of service quality and deteriorating
rating informativeness. The term θi captures the cost (e.g., psychological cost) for
a guests to give a low rating. Together, these terms capture the trade-off faced
by the guest when choosing whether to rate a host and what rating to disclose.
While psychological costs may encourage guests to inflate ratings, guests also have
an incentive to provide informative ratings as a contribution to other users on the
platform. The two forces work in opposite direction and together determine the rating
guests report.
The second part is ri, the rating guest i receives from the host, which captures
the fact that the guest i has reputation concerns. The reason for ri to be part of
the guest’s utility is to match the Airbnb setting, where a host can rate the guest,
and this rating affects whether future hosts will accept the guest’s accommodation
request.
In all our analysis, we only consider ratings produced under the new simultaneous
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Airbnb reputation mechanism. Therefore, strategic rating manipulation of ratings is
not a concern, i.e., hosts cannot strategically collude with guests to exchange high
ratings which implies that ri is not a function of rh,i.
In the equilibrium of this model, a host receives a higher rating than in the simple
model, and the inflated ratings depend on the average level of θi associated with
the pool of the guests. While θi may be affected by the interaction between guests
and hosts, it seems unlikely that it is also correlated with market participation, since
this information is not revealed to guests. Unless we are willing to assume such a
correlation, we cannot easily explain the difference in ratings observed in Section 1.5.3.
The formal proof of this statement is as follows.
Proof : Under this model, the only choice variable of the guest during Period 2 is
rh,i. If guest i decides to request the accommodation, her ex-ante utility in Period 1
is given by
Vi(transact|P ) = max
rh,i
E[vh]− xi − P +E[ri − αi1{rating}|rh,i − (vh − xi)|}, (3.50)
where 1{rating} = 1 iff rh,i > θi.
The ex-post utility of guest i at the end of Period 2 is given by
ui(rh,i) = max
rh,i
{vh − xi + ri − αi1{rating}|rh,i − (vh − xi)|}, (3.51)
where 1{rating} = 1 iff rh,i > θi.
With respect to the best response of guest i, two options exist:
1. If rh,i ≥ θi, then:
Vi(transact|P ) = E[vh]− xi − P + E[ri − αi|rh,i − (vh − xi)|], (3.52)
ui(rh,i) = [vh − xi + ri − αi|rh,i − (vh − xi)|], (3.53)
where ui(rh,i) is the ex-post utility after the accommodation stay. Then from
Equation 3.53 and αi > 0, we have:
rh,i = vh − xi. (3.54)
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2. If rh,i < θi, then, the guest i does not publish a rating.
Then the ex-ante utility for a guest to enter the market is given by:
Vi(transact|P ) = E[vh]− xi − P + E[ri]
+αi[Prob(vh − xi > θi) ∗ [vh − xi − (vh − xi)]
+(1− Prob(vh − xi > θi)) ∗ 0]. (3.55)
Note that under simultaneous ratings, guest i cannot directly influence ri by choosing
the rating she gives to the host. Thus, the only choice of guest i in Period 1 is to
transact if and only if E[vh] − xi − P ≥ 0. Therefore, the following conditions still





























where x∗∗ ≡ min{vh − θi, E[vh]− P1}, and f is the density function of xi.






Rbiased −Runbiased = g(θ) > 0, (3.56)
i.e., the average rating under selection bias is higher than the average rating without
selection bias, and their difference is a function of θ. Under this condition, to ob-
serve systematically lower ratings for professional hosts we need to assume that vph is
systematically lower than vch, or that the distribution of vch first order stochastically
dominates (FOSD) the distribution of vph.
Alternatively, to explain the rating patterns observed, we could assume that guests
of professional and casual hosts differ systematically in their θ, the psychological cost
of leaving a bad review. Specifically, guests of professional hosts must have a system-
atically lower psychological threshold than guests of casual hosts. However, guests
cannot observe hosts market participation and, thus, they cannot discern between
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professional or casual hosts; and hosts cannot infer the guests’ θ, so they cannot se-
lect a specific type of guest. Thus, this self-selection of guests depending on the host
type (and vice versa) is unlikely to occur in practice.11 Q.E.D.
A.2.3 Relaxing the risk neutral assumption
In this section, we relax the risk-neutral assumption, and allow the behavior of the
guests to enter into the utility function of the host. We propose this modification
because of the nature of Airbnb transactions. Since Airbnb hosts share their own
properties, it is natural to expect them to be risk-averse towards guest misconduct.
Formally speaking, we assume the effort of the guest i, denoted as ei, to enter into
the utility of the host, and the host’s utility is assumed to be concave with respect
to ei. The utility function of the host is given by:
Vh(P ) = max
P
{E[PQ− C(Q)|P ] + E[(rh,i + uh(ei))|P ]}, (3.57)
where, as before, P denotes price, Q denotes the transaction volume, and vh(P )
denotes the ex-ante utility contingent on choosing price P . rh,i is the rating the host
receives from the guest i. The term uh(ei) shows that the guest’s effort ei affects
the host’s welfare. The concavity of uh captures the risk aversion of the host. Then,
hosts trade off expected profits against the possibility of guest misconduct in accepting
guests. While this assumption reduces the number of guests a host will accept, the
host’s rating do not affect service quality since it is still exogenously given and fixed.




{E[PQ− C(Q)|P ] + E[rh,i]}. (3.58)
Independently of which assumptions are invoked on rh,i, the absence of strate-
gic manipulation of rh,i makes it impossible to alter the optimality problem, which
therefore is analogue to the simple model discussed above.
Moreover, since service quality is exogenously given in this scenario, to explain
the systematically lower ratings to professional hosts we would need to assume that
the service quality of casual and professional hosts follow different distributions, and
11Note that even under the assumption that hosts are able to infer guests’ θ, all hosts, and in
particular professional hosts, who have a higher weight on reputation, would select those guests with
higher θ in order to reduce the probability of receiving a lower rating.
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that the distribution of vch FOSD the distribution of v
p
h.
A.2.4 Endogenous service quality
Next, we relax the exogenous service quality assumption. We allow service quality to
vary between transactions. This assumption is consistent with the high heterogeneity
of service quality on Airbnb. In this scenario, we consider three alternative models.
Model I: Hosts only care about profit and reputation
First, we endogenize service quality without changing the assumption that hosts care
only about profit and reputation. The optimality problem of the host in Period 1 is
given by:
Uh,1(P ) = max
P
{E[PQ− C(Q)|P ] + E[Uh,2(eh, rh,i)]}. (3.59)
Demand is realized in Period 1, while only reputation concerns and effort cost
determine effort levels in Period 2. Then, the host’s optimality problem in Period 2
is:
Uh,2(eh, rh,i) = max
eh
{βhrh,i − Ch(eh)}. (3.60)
Because of their higher market participation, professional hosts have a higher
weight on reputation concerns, i.e., professional hosts have systematically higher βh.
With the assumption that guests report hosts’ effort levels in ratings rh,i, i.e., rh,i =
eh.
From the FOC, we have
C ′h(eh)
∗ = βh. (3.61)
The above condition solves for the optimal level of e∗h.
If the effort cost function is identical across hosts, i.e., the function Cp(eh) =
Cc(eh) ≡ C(eh) for all eh, and effort costs increase with effort level, i.e., C ′(eh) >
0,∀eh, then professional hosts exert higher levels effort due to their higher βh, i.e.,
from βp > βc and C ′h > 0, we have e∗p > e∗c .
Even if the effort cost function of professional hosts is systematically different from
that of casual hosts, because of economies of scale, it is unlikely that the latter have
systematically lower marginal effort cost than professional hosts.That is, C ′(ep) ≤
C ′(ec) for each eh. Even if we assume C ′(ep) > C ′(ec) for some eh, the difference in
marginal effort cost has to be large enough to offset the effect of βh so that casual
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hosts can exert systematically higher effort under this model. Therefore, this model
cannot easily explain why professional hosts have lower ratings.
Model II: Hosts also care about guest behavior
In this model hosts also care about guest behavior. Hosts on Airbnb are relatively
“small” service providers compared to firms in the accommodation industry, such as
Hilton or Marriott. Therefore, a natural assumption is that hosts are risk- averse with
respect to possible guest misconduct. We model this by letting guest conduct enters
hosts’ utility function. However, as we show, simply introducing guest conduct in the
utility function of a risk- averse host does not suffice to explain why professional hosts
have lower ratings than casual hosts. Formally speaking, if we assume ei and eh are
separable in the host’s utility, guest behavior cannot alter the host’s effort. Thus, we
have to further assume a non-separable function of eh and ei as we do in our main
model.
As Uh takes a separable functional form of ei and eh, without loss of generality we
assume Uh is given by:
Uh(eh, rh,i) = max
eh
g(ei)− Ch(eh) + βhrh,i, (3.62)
where g(ei) captures the effect of guests’ conduct on the host’s utility, and the con-
cavity of g(·) models the host’s risk averse attitude towards the guest misconduct.
Assuming rh,i = eh, we have the same FOC as the previous model, i.e., C ′h(eh)∗ =
βh. This means that ei does not determine the optimal level of eh and therefore it
cannot explain the difference in ratings between casual and professional hosts.
Model III: Hosts have interdependent preference
Next, we assume that the host has interdependent preference (without assuming the
reciprocity feature discussed in our main theoretical framework), i.e., the utility of
guest i, denoted as Ui, enters into the host’s utility function.
Under this assumption, the optimality problem of the host is given by:
Uh(eh, ei, rh,i) = max
eh
g(ei) + αhUi(ei)− Ch(eh) + βhrh,i, (3.63)
where Ui is the ex-post utility of guest i given by Ui(ei, eh, ri) = f(eh)−Ci(ei) + βiri.
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Also, ei and eh are the efforts of guest i and the host h, respectively. The function g(·)
denotes how much hosts care about guest’s behavior, and f(·) denotes guest utility
derived from host’s effort.
To derive a closed-from solution of the optimal effort level, we assume f(eh) = e1−kh



















If casual hosts differ from professional hosts only in βh, and professional hosts have
a higher level of βh, we have e∗p > e∗c . Therefore, rch,i < r
p
h,i, ∀i. Thus, the average
rating of professional hosts is expected to be higher than casual hosts, contradicting
the what we observe in the Airbnb data.
In order to explain the systematically lower ratings of professional hosts, we need
an additional assumption. Specifically, we need to assume that casual hosts are sys-
tematically more altruistic than professionals. This assumption can be implemented
by adding the parameters αg in front of the interdependent utility term in the gross
utility of the host, and assuming that the difference on the altruism weights are larger
than the difference between reputation weights. Formally stated:
αc − αp > βp − βc > 0,
where αc and αp are the weights on guests’ utility of the non-professional hosts and
the professional hosts, respectively.
By invoking this assumption, we allow casual hosts to have systematically higher
intrinsic altruism, and the difference between altruistic attitude is large enough to
offset the difference between reputation concerns. However, we consider altruistic
behavior to be a larger departure from standard assumptions, and our explanation




B1.1. Error Cost Ratio under Common Demand Function Assumptions
Proposition 2.1.
The demand curve is linear p = A−bq and the marginal cost is a constant c. Optimal
output is q? = A−c
2b
and monopolistic price p? = A+c
2
. The competitive price is pc = c
and output is qc = A−c
b
. The minimum social loss under antitrust law that deters
entry is RS + π = 3(A−c)
2
8b
, the maximum social loss if the firm is allowed to enter the
market is D = (A−c)
2
8b




The demand curve is algebraic p = αqβ − σ and the marginal cost is a constant
c, so the firm’s profit maximization problem is maxq : (αqβ − σ)q − cq. Optimal












)1/β. The minimum social loss
when antitrust law deters entry is given by
RS + π =
∫ q?
0




q?β+1 − (σ + c)q?














[αqβ − σ − c]dq
















































with β ∈ (−1, 0). Because e = limn→∞(1 + 1n)

















The demand curve is exponential q = γe−βp and the marginal cost is a constant
c. The inverse demand curve is p = β−1 ln γ − β−1 ln q. Optimal output satisfies
β−1 ln γ − β−1 ln q − β−1 = c, so that q? = γe−(βc+1) and p? = βc+1
β
. The competitive
price is pc = c and output is qc = γe−βc. The social loss under antitrust law that
deters firm’s entry is































































B1.2 Effect of Elasticity on Error Cost Ratio under Isoelastic Demand
From proposition 2.1 and 2.4, we have that, the error cost ratio is a constant number,
when the demand function is linear or exponential. However, when the demand
function is algebraic p = αqβ−σ, or is isoelasticp = αqβ, where β ∈ (−1, 0), the error
cost ratio is a function of demand elasticity. We claim that the ratio ρ decreases with
regard to demand elasticity ε .= − 1
β
.


















































































































































is monotonically decreasing with ε in (1,+∞).
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B1.3. Negative Relationship between Elasticity and Profit
Lemma 2. (Negative Relationship between Elasticity and Profit) The price
elasticity functions for these demand representations are given by: (i) The isoelastic
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(iii) The price elasticity of exponential demand function is given by
εexp(p) = βp.




for the above three cases.
Case I: Isolastic Demand Function From the proceeding result in the Proposi-












Then we have the monopoly profit is given by
π∗
.












Plug that ε ≡ − 1
β











lnπ∗ = (1− ε)lnc+ (ε− 1)ln(ε− 1)− ε(lnε− lnα). (3.72)
We can back out the sign of derivative ∂π∗
∂ε




























Then from the model primitive β ∈ (−1, 0),we have
β ∈ (−1, 0)⇒ ε > 1






Assume 0 < α < c, then ln α
c







Case II: Algebraic Demand Function From the proceeding result in the Propo-





and monopolistic price is p? = σ+c
β+1
− σ.
Then we have the monopoly profit is given by
π∗
.





















Plug that ε ≡ − 1
β








= αεε−ε(c+ σ)1−ε(ε− 1)ε−1.
Then we have
lnπ∗ = (ε− 1)ln(ε− 1) + (1− ε)ln(σ + c) + εlnα− ε ln ε. (3.74)
We can back out the sign of derivative ∂π∗
∂ε




















= ln(ε− 1)− ln ε− ln(σ + c) + lnα,
Then from the model primitive β ∈ (−1, 0), we have
β ∈ (−1, 0)⇒ ε > 1
⇒ ln(ε− 1)− ln ε < 0.







Case III: Exponential Demand Function From the proceeding result in the
Proposition 4, the monopoly quantity, under exponential demand function, is q? =
γe−(βc+1) and monopolistic price is p? = βc+1
β
. The monopoly profit is given by
π∗ = (p∗ − c) q? = γ
β
e(−1−βc).
From proceeding result, we have that the elasticity parameter εAexp = β. Thus, to
analyze the effect of market elasticity parameter on the monopoly profit, we take the
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partial derivative of profit with regard to β, i.e.,
∂π∗
∂β













B1.4. Isoelastic Demand and Uniform Distribution of Investment Cost
Assume the R&D investment cost follows uniform distribution on (0, K̄]. To compute
the adjusted error cost ratio, we first compute the probability of a firm with the firm’s















where the firm enters regardless of enforcement, if (1− v)π∗ > K̄, thus,
ρ̃ =
0 if (1− v)π∗ > K̄,( K̄
(1−v)π∗ − 1)ρ if (1− v)π
∗ ≤ K̄.
When elasticity is not small, such that (1 − v)π∗ ≤ K̄. the adjusted error cost
ratio taking into account the dynamic effect of enforcement can now be expressed as


















Static and Dynamic Effects under Isoelastic Demand and Uniform Distri-
bution of Investment Cost


























































































. Plug equation (3.75) in the expression of





















































































We can compare the magnitude of static and dynamic effects by the absolute
value of equation (3.76) and equation (3.80). We have that the static effect dominates

















































































1 + ρ =
εε
εε − (2ε− 1)(ε− 1)ε−1
. (3.84)
Plug equation (3.84) back in the comparison inequality (3.81), we have that static
effect dominates, if(
K̄ − (1− v)π∗
)
εε



















B2. Simulations with Varying Enforcement Probability
In this appendix, we show how the adjusted error cost ratio changes according to
the enforcement probability. In the main text, we show the adjusted error cost ratio
and corresponding static and dynamic effects under small enforcement probability,
v = 0.2. If the enforcement probability increases, the adjusted error cost ratio curve
shifts up. So does the dynamic effect curves, while the changes of static effect is
smaller than dynamic effect.
Medium Enforcement Probability In figure 4, we assume the enforcement prob-
ability is at medium level, v = 0.5. The adjusted error ratio is higher than that under
v = 0.2, shown in figure 4. The lower bound of adjusted error cost ratio now is about
13, when the demand elasticity is about 1.09.






































Figure 3.1: Medium Enforcement Probability v = 0.5
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High Enforcement Probability In figure 5, we assume the enforcement proba-
bility is high, v = 0.8. The adjusted error ratio shifts up further than figure 5 and
figure 4. The lower bound of adjusted error cost ratio now is about 42, when the
demand elasticity is about 1.11.










































Figure 3.2: High Enforcement Probability v = 0.8
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Appendix C
Appendix C1. Result Tables
Principal’s Parameters
Rα,H Rα,L Rβ Rσ δ λα λβ θα θβ
20 14.5 8 0.85 0.8 0.5 0.55 0.2 0.51
Structural Parameters Agent’s Parameters
ψH ψL A B
0.5 0.5 3 1
Table 3.5: Parameters for the Large-Human-Capital-Payoff Case
Principal’s Parameters
Rα,H Rα,L Rβ Rσ δ λα λβ θα θβ
20 14.5 8 0.85 0.8 0.5 0.55 0.2 0.51
Structural Parameters Agent’s Parameters
ψH ψL A B
0.5 0.5 0.03 0.01


























Table 3.7: Principal’s Expected Utility: Symmetric Information
Notes: The above table reports the principal’s expected utility of all possible action plans as
if the principal knows the agent’s private information, given the parameters of the principal
valued as in Table 3.4. The column of UPH shows the principal’s expected utility when the
success payoff of project α is high, i.e., Rα,H ; while the one of UPL shows the case when the
























Table 3.8: Principal’s Expected Utilities under Pooling
Notes: The above table reports the ex ante utility of the principal, if the same action is
implemented under both types – the pooling case, given the parameters of the principal




Table 3.9: Principal’s Expected Utility from Separation without Monetary Transfers. Notes: 
The above table reports the expected total project payoffs without netting out the monetary transfer paid 
to the agent. Each cell in the table indicates to the maximal expected utility under a pair of action. 
↵↵↵;↵↵  3.51284 ↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 2.81076   ↵;  ↵ 3.82596 ↵  ;  ↵ 3.53228 ↵  ;  ↵ 3.55668
↵↵↵;↵↵  3.011 ↵↵ ;↵   3.3286   ↵;    3.81257 ↵  ;    3.51889 ↵  ;    3.54329
↵↵↵;    3.8196 ↵↵ ;↵   2.82676   ↵;    3.65328 ↵  ;    3.3596 ↵  ;    3.384
↵↵↵;  ↵ 3.83299 ↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 2.755   ↵; ↵ 3.41628 ↵  ; ↵ 3.1226 ↵  ; ↵ 3.147
↵↵↵;    3.66031 ↵↵ ;↵   3.27284   ↵;   3.51388 ↵  ;   3.2202 ↵  ;   3.2446
↵↵↵;↵ ↵ 2.90476 ↵↵ ;↵   2.771   ↵;   2.95628 ↵  ;   2.6626 ↵  ;   2.687
↵↵↵;↵   3.4226 ↵↵ ; ↵↵ 3.408    ;↵ ↵ 3.35007 ↵  ;↵ ↵ 2.55476  ↵↵; ↵  3.61061
↵↵↵;↵   2.92076 ↵↵ ; ↵  3.39461    ;↵   3.75791 ↵  ;↵   2.9626  ↵↵; ↵  3.45132
↵↵↵;↵ ↵ 2.849 ↵↵ ; ↵  3.23532    ;↵   3.25607 ↵  ;↵   2.46076  ↵↵;  ↵ 3.55668
↵↵↵;↵   3.36684 ↵↵ ;  ↵ 3.34068    ;↵ ↵ 3.29431 ↵  ; ↵↵ 3.09776  ↵↵;    3.54329
↵↵↵;↵   2.865 ↵↵ ;    3.32729    ;↵   3.70215 ↵  ; ↵  3.08437  ↵↵;    3.384
↵↵↵; ↵↵ 3.502 ↵↵ ;    3.168    ;↵   3.20031 ↵  ; ↵  2.92508  ↵↵; ↵ 3.147
↵↵↵; ↵  3.48861 ↵↵ ; ↵ 2.931    ; ↵↵ 3.78231 ↵  ;  ↵ 3.03044  ↵↵;   3.2446
↵↵↵; ↵  3.32932 ↵↵ ;   3.0286    ; ↵  3.61063 ↵  ;    3.01705  ↵↵;   2.687
↵↵↵;  ↵ 3.43468 ↵↵ ;   2.471    ; ↵  3.45134 ↵  ;    2.85776  ↵ ; ↵  3.27964
↵↵↵;    3.42129    ;  ↵ 4.21088    ;  ↵ 3.65328 ↵  ; ↵ 2.62076  ↵ ;  ↵ 3.48158
↵↵↵;    3.262    ;    3.87991    ;    3.4816 ↵  ;   2.71836  ↵ ;    3.37161
↵↵↵; ↵ 3.025    ;↵ ↵ 3.50936    ;    3.32231 ↵  ;   2.16076  ↵ ;    3.21232
↵↵↵;   3.1226    ;↵   3.9172    ; ↵ 3.08531 ↵ ↵;↵   3.00084  ↵ ; ↵ 2.97532
↵↵↵;   2.565    ;↵   3.41536    ;   3.18291 ↵ ↵;↵   2.499  ↵ ;   3.07292
↵↵ ;↵↵  2.80384    ;↵ ↵ 3.4536    ;   2.62531 ↵ ↵; ↵↵ 3.136  ↵ ;   2.51532
↵↵ ;    4.22744    ;↵   3.86144 ↵ ↵;↵   3.11236 ↵ ↵; ↵  3.12261  ↵ ;  ↵ 3.32229
↵↵ ;  ↵ 4.24083    ;↵   3.3596 ↵ ↵;↵   2.61052 ↵ ↵; ↵  2.96332  ↵ ;    3.21232
↵↵ ;    4.06815    ; ↵↵ 3.9416 ↵ ↵;↵ ↵ 2.53876 ↵ ↵;  ↵ 3.06868  ↵ ;    3.05303
↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 3.3126    ; ↵  3.76992 ↵ ↵;↵   3.0566 ↵ ↵;    3.05529  ↵ ; ↵ 2.81603
↵↵ ;↵   3.83044    ; ↵  3.61063 ↵ ↵;↵   2.55476 ↵ ↵;    2.896  ↵ ;   2.91363
↵↵ ;↵   3.3286    ;  ↵ 3.81257 ↵ ↵; ↵↵ 3.19176 ↵ ↵; ↵ 2.659  ↵ ;   2.35603
↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 3.25684    ;    3.64089 ↵ ↵; ↵  3.17837 ↵ ↵;   2.7566   ↵;    3.41426
↵↵ ;↵   3.77468    ;    3.4816 ↵ ↵; ↵  3.01908 ↵ ↵;   2.199   ↵;    3.25497
↵↵ ;↵   3.27284    ; ↵ 3.2446 ↵ ↵;  ↵ 3.12444 ↵  ;↵   2.90684   ↵; ↵ 3.01797
↵↵ ; ↵↵ 3.90984    ;   3.3422 ↵ ↵;    3.11105 ↵  ; ↵↵ 3.54384   ↵;   3.11557
↵↵ ; ↵  3.89645    ;   2.0196 ↵ ↵;    2.95176 ↵  ; ↵  3.53045   ↵;   2.55797
↵↵ ; ↵  3.73716   ↵;    4.05159 ↵ ↵; ↵ 2.71476 ↵  ; ↵  3.37116    ;    3.08329
↵↵ ;  ↵ 3.84252   ↵;↵ ↵ 3.52275 ↵ ↵;   2.81236 ↵  ;  ↵ 3.47652    ; ↵ 2.84629
↵↵ ;    3.82913   ↵;↵   3.93059 ↵ ↵;   2.25476 ↵  ;    3.46313    ;   2.94389
↵↵ ;    3.66984   ↵;↵   3.42875 ↵  ;↵   3.01836 ↵  ;    3.30384    ;   2.38629
↵↵ ; ↵ 3.43284   ↵;↵ ↵ 3.46699 ↵  ;↵ ↵ 3.0566 ↵  ; ↵ 3.06684    ; ↵ 2.687
↵↵ ;   3.53044   ↵;↵   3.87483 ↵  ;↵   3.46444 ↵  ;   3.16444    ;   2.7846
↵↵ ;   2.97284   ↵;↵   3.37299 ↵  ;↵   2.9626 ↵  ;   2.60684    ;   2.227
↵↵ ;    3.7256   ↵; ↵↵ 3.95499 ↵  ; ↵↵ 3.5996 ↵  ; ↵↵ 3.042  ↵;   2.5476
↵↵ ;  ↵ 3.73899   ↵; ↵  3.87989 ↵  ; ↵  3.58621 ↵  ; ↵  3.02861  ↵;   1.99
↵↵ ;    3.56631   ↵; ↵  3.7206 ↵  ; ↵  3.42692 ↵  ; ↵  2.86932   ;   2.0876
Table 3.9: Principal’s Expected Utility from Separation without Monetary Transfers
Notes: The above table reports the expected total project payoffs without netting out the monetary





Table 3.10: Agent’s Expected Utility Difference: the Large-Human-Capital-Payoff Case.  
Notes: The table is the absolute value of the agent’s expected utility difference in the pair of action plans 
under the large-human-capital-payoff case. Each cell corresponds to one pair of action plans. 
↵↵↵;↵↵  1.440 ↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 2.000   ↵;  ↵ 0.988 ↵  ;  ↵ 0.200 ↵  ;  ↵ 1.000
↵↵↵;↵↵  2.160 ↵↵ ;↵   0.560   ↵;    1.563 ↵  ;    0.776 ↵  ;    1.576
↵↵↵;    0.600 ↵↵ ;↵   0.160   ↵;    0.988 ↵  ;    0.200 ↵  ;    1.000
↵↵↵;  ↵ 1.176 ↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 1.920   ↵; ↵ 0.012 ↵  ; ↵ 0.800 ↵  ; ↵ 0.000
↵↵↵;    1.176 ↵↵ ;↵   0.480   ↵;   0.788 ↵  ;   0.000 ↵  ;   0.800
↵↵↵;↵ ↵ 0.160 ↵↵ ;↵   0.240   ↵;   0.012 ↵  ;   0.800 ↵  ;   0.000
↵↵↵;↵   1.600 ↵↵ ; ↵↵ 0.760    ;↵ ↵ 2.228 ↵  ;↵ ↵ 2.080  ↵↵; ↵  0.576
↵↵↵;↵   2.320 ↵↵ ; ↵  1.336    ;↵   0.788 ↵  ;↵   0.640  ↵↵; ↵  0.673
↵↵↵;↵ ↵ 0.240 ↵↵ ; ↵  1.433    ;↵   0.068 ↵  ;↵   0.080  ↵↵;  ↵ 0.000
↵↵↵;↵   1.680 ↵↵ ;  ↵ 0.760    ;↵ ↵ 2.148 ↵  ; ↵↵ 0.920  ↵↵;    0.576
↵↵↵;↵   2.400 ↵↵ ;    1.336    ;↵   0.708 ↵  ; ↵  1.496  ↵↵;    0.000
↵↵↵; ↵↵ 1.400 ↵↵ ;    0.760    ;↵   0.012 ↵  ; ↵  1.593  ↵↵; ↵ 1.000
↵↵↵; ↵  0.824 ↵↵ ; ↵ 0.240    ; ↵↵ 0.988 ↵  ;  ↵ 0.920  ↵↵;   0.200
↵↵↵; ↵  0.727 ↵↵ ;   0.560    ; ↵  1.563 ↵  ;    1.496  ↵↵;   1.000
↵↵↵;  ↵ 1.400 ↵↵ ;   0.240    ; ↵  1.661 ↵  ;    0.920  ↵ ; ↵  0.098
↵↵↵;    0.824    ;  ↵ 1.206    ;  ↵ 0.988 ↵  ; ↵ 0.080  ↵ ;  ↵ 0.576
↵↵↵;    1.400    ;    1.206    ;    1.563 ↵  ;   0.720  ↵ ;    0.000
↵↵↵; ↵ 2.400    ;↵ ↵ 2.222    ;    0.988 ↵  ;   0.080  ↵ ;    0.576
↵↵↵;   1.600    ;↵   0.782    ; ↵ 0.012 ↵ ↵;↵   1.440  ↵ ; ↵ 1.576
↵↵↵;   2.400    ;↵   0.062    ;   0.788 ↵ ↵;↵   2.160  ↵ ;   0.776
↵↵ ;↵↵  0.720    ;↵ ↵ 2.142    ;   0.012 ↵ ↵; ↵↵ 1.160  ↵ ;   1.576
↵↵ ;    0.840    ;↵   0.702 ↵ ↵;↵   1.440 ↵ ↵; ↵  0.584  ↵ ;  ↵ 0.673
↵↵ ;  ↵ 0.264    ;↵   0.018 ↵ ↵;↵   2.160 ↵ ↵; ↵  0.487  ↵ ;    0.098
↵↵ ;    0.264    ; ↵↵ 0.982 ↵ ↵;↵ ↵ 0.080 ↵ ↵;  ↵ 1.160  ↵ ;    0.673
↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 1.280    ; ↵  1.558 ↵ ↵;↵   1.520 ↵ ↵;    0.584  ↵ ; ↵ 1.673
↵↵ ;↵   0.160    ; ↵  1.655 ↵ ↵;↵   2.240 ↵ ↵;    1.160  ↵ ;   0.873
↵↵ ;↵   0.880    ;  ↵ 0.982 ↵ ↵; ↵↵ 1.240 ↵ ↵; ↵ 2.160  ↵ ;   1.673
↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 1.200    ;    1.558 ↵ ↵; ↵  0.664 ↵ ↵;   1.360   ↵;    0.576
↵↵ ;↵   0.240    ;    0.982 ↵ ↵; ↵  0.567 ↵ ↵;   2.160   ↵;    0.000
↵↵ ;↵   0.960    ; ↵ 0.018 ↵ ↵;  ↵ 1.240 ↵  ;↵   0.720   ↵; ↵ 1.000
↵↵ ; ↵↵ 0.040    ;   0.782 ↵ ↵;    0.664 ↵  ; ↵↵ 0.280   ↵;   0.200
↵↵ ; ↵  0.616    ;   0.018 ↵ ↵;    1.240 ↵  ; ↵  0.856   ↵;   1.000
↵↵ ; ↵  0.713   ↵;    1.212 ↵ ↵; ↵ 2.240 ↵  ; ↵  0.953    ;    0.984
↵↵ ;  ↵ 0.040   ↵;↵ ↵ 2.228 ↵ ↵;   1.440 ↵  ;  ↵ 0.280    ; ↵ 0.016
↵↵ ;    0.616   ↵;↵   0.788 ↵ ↵;   2.240 ↵  ;    0.856    ;   0.784
↵↵ ;    0.040   ↵;↵   0.068 ↵  ;↵   0.720 ↵  ;    0.280    ;   0.016
↵↵ ; ↵ 0.960   ↵;↵ ↵ 2.148 ↵  ;↵ ↵ 1.360 ↵  ; ↵ 0.720    ; ↵ 0.010
↵↵ ;   0.160   ↵;↵   0.708 ↵  ;↵   0.080 ↵  ;   0.080    ;   0.790
↵↵ ;   0.960   ↵;↵   0.012 ↵  ;↵   0.800 ↵  ;   0.720    ;   0.010
↵↵ ;    1.560   ↵; ↵↵ 0.988 ↵  ; ↵↵ 0.200 ↵  ; ↵↵ 1.000  ↵;   0.776
↵↵ ;  ↵ 0.984   ↵; ↵  1.563 ↵  ; ↵  0.776 ↵  ; ↵  1.576  ↵;   0.024
↵↵ ;    0.984   ↵; ↵  1.661 ↵  ; ↵  0.873 ↵  ; ↵  1.673   ;   0.800
Table 3.10: Agent’s Expected Utility Difference: the Large-Human-Capital-Payoff Case
Notes: The table is the absolute value of the agent’s expected utility difference in the pair of action




Table 3.11: Agent’s Expected Utility Difference: Small-Human-Capital-Payoff Case.  
Notes: The table is the absolute value of the agent’s expected utility difference in the pair of action plans 
under the small=human-capital-payoff case. Each cell corresponds to one pair of action plans. 
↵↵↵;↵↵  0.0144 ↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 0.0200   ↵;  ↵ 0.0022 ↵  ;  ↵ 0.0020 ↵  ;  ↵ 0.0100
↵↵↵;↵↵  0.0216 ↵↵ ;↵   0.0056   ↵;    0.0035 ↵  ;    0.0078 ↵  ;    0.0158
↵↵↵;    0.0060 ↵↵ ;↵   0.0016   ↵;    0.0022 ↵  ;    0.0020 ↵  ;    0.0100
↵↵↵;  ↵ 0.0118 ↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 0.0192   ↵; ↵ 0.0122 ↵  ; ↵ 0.0080 ↵  ; ↵ 0.0000
↵↵↵;    0.0118 ↵↵ ;↵   0.0048   ↵;   0.0042 ↵  ;   0.0000 ↵  ;   0.0080
↵↵↵;↵ ↵ 0.0016 ↵↵ ;↵   0.0024   ↵;   0.0122 ↵  ;   0.0080 ↵  ;   0.0000
↵↵↵;↵   0.0160 ↵↵ ; ↵↵ 0.0076    ;↵ ↵ 0.0102 ↵  ;↵ ↵ 0.0208  ↵↵; ↵  0.0058
↵↵↵;↵   0.0232 ↵↵ ; ↵  0.0134    ;↵   0.0042 ↵  ;↵   0.0064  ↵↵; ↵  0.0067
↵↵↵;↵ ↵ 0.0024 ↵↵ ; ↵  0.0143    ;↵   0.0114 ↵  ;↵   0.0008  ↵↵;  ↵ 0.0000
↵↵↵;↵   0.0168 ↵↵ ;  ↵ 0.0076    ;↵ ↵ 0.0094 ↵  ; ↵↵ 0.0092  ↵↵;    0.0058
↵↵↵;↵   0.0240 ↵↵ ;    0.0134    ;↵   0.0050 ↵  ; ↵  0.0150  ↵↵;    0.0000
↵↵↵; ↵↵ 0.0140 ↵↵ ;    0.0076    ;↵   0.0122 ↵  ; ↵  0.0159  ↵↵; ↵ 0.0100
↵↵↵; ↵  0.0082 ↵↵ ; ↵ 0.0024    ; ↵↵ 0.0022 ↵  ;  ↵ 0.0092  ↵↵;   0.0020
↵↵↵; ↵  0.0073 ↵↵ ;   0.0056    ; ↵  0.0035 ↵  ;    0.0150  ↵↵;   0.0100
↵↵↵;  ↵ 0.0140 ↵↵ ;   0.0024    ; ↵  0.0045 ↵  ;    0.0092  ↵ ; ↵  0.0010
↵↵↵;    0.0082    ;  ↵ 0.0058    ;  ↵ 0.0022 ↵  ; ↵ 0.0008  ↵ ;  ↵ 0.0058
↵↵↵;    0.0140    ;    0.0058    ;    0.0035 ↵  ;   0.0072  ↵ ;    0.0000
↵↵↵; ↵ 0.0240    ;↵ ↵ 0.0044    ;    0.0022 ↵  ;   0.0008  ↵ ;    0.0058
↵↵↵;   0.0160    ;↵   0.0100    ; ↵ 0.0122 ↵ ↵;↵   0.0144  ↵ ; ↵ 0.0158
↵↵↵;   0.0240    ;↵   0.0172    ;   0.0042 ↵ ↵;↵   0.0216  ↵ ;   0.0078
↵↵ ;↵↵  0.0072    ;↵ ↵ 0.0036    ;   0.0122 ↵ ↵; ↵↵ 0.0116  ↵ ;   0.0158
↵↵ ;    0.0084    ;↵   0.0108 ↵ ↵;↵   0.0144 ↵ ↵; ↵  0.0058  ↵ ;  ↵ 0.0067
↵↵ ;  ↵ 0.0026    ;↵   0.0180 ↵ ↵;↵   0.0216 ↵ ↵; ↵  0.0049  ↵ ;    0.0010
↵↵ ;    0.0026    ; ↵↵ 0.0080 ↵ ↵;↵ ↵ 0.0008 ↵ ↵;  ↵ 0.0116  ↵ ;    0.0067
↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 0.0128    ; ↵  0.0022 ↵ ↵;↵   0.0152 ↵ ↵;    0.0058  ↵ ; ↵ 0.0167
↵↵ ;↵   0.0016    ; ↵  0.0013 ↵ ↵;↵   0.0224 ↵ ↵;    0.0116  ↵ ;   0.0087
↵↵ ;↵   0.0088    ;  ↵ 0.0080 ↵ ↵; ↵↵ 0.0124 ↵ ↵; ↵ 0.0216  ↵ ;   0.0167
↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 0.0120    ;    0.0022 ↵ ↵; ↵  0.0066 ↵ ↵;   0.0136   ↵;    0.0058
↵↵ ;↵   0.0024    ;    0.0080 ↵ ↵; ↵  0.0057 ↵ ↵;   0.0216   ↵;    0.0000
↵↵ ;↵   0.0096    ; ↵ 0.0180 ↵ ↵;  ↵ 0.0124 ↵  ;↵   0.0167   ↵; ↵ 0.0100
↵↵ ; ↵↵ 0.0004    ;   0.0100 ↵ ↵;    0.0066 ↵  ; ↵↵ 0.0100   ↵;   0.0020
↵↵ ; ↵  0.0062    ;   0.0180 ↵ ↵;    0.0124 ↵  ; ↵  0.0158   ↵;   0.0100
↵↵ ; ↵  0.0071   ↵;    0.0000 ↵ ↵; ↵ 0.0224 ↵  ; ↵  0.0100    ;    0.0058
↵↵ ;  ↵ 0.0004   ↵;↵ ↵ 0.0102 ↵ ↵;   0.0144 ↵  ;  ↵ 0.0000    ; ↵ 0.0158
↵↵ ;    0.0062   ↵;↵   0.0042 ↵ ↵;   0.0224 ↵  ;    0.0080    ;   0.0078
↵↵ ;    0.0004   ↵;↵   0.0114 ↵  ;↵   0.0072 ↵  ;    0.0000    ;   0.0158
↵↵ ; ↵ 0.0096   ↵;↵ ↵ 0.0094 ↵  ;↵ ↵ 0.0136 ↵  ; ↵ 0.0058    ; ↵ 0.0100
↵↵ ;   0.0016   ↵;↵   0.0050 ↵  ;↵   0.0008 ↵  ;   0.0067    ;   0.0020
↵↵ ;   0.0096   ↵;↵   0.0122 ↵  ;↵   0.0080 ↵  ;   0.0000    ;   0.0100
↵↵ ;    0.0156   ↵; ↵↵ 0.0022 ↵  ; ↵↵ 0.0020 ↵  ; ↵↵ 0.0072  ↵;   0.0160
↵↵ ;  ↵ 0.0098   ↵; ↵  0.0035 ↵  ; ↵  0.0078 ↵  ; ↵  0.0028  ↵;   0.0240
↵↵ ;    0.0098   ↵; ↵  0.0045 ↵  ; ↵  0.0087 ↵  ; ↵  0.0086   ;   0.0800
Table 3.11: Agent’s Expected Utility Difference: Small-Human-Capital-Payoff Case
Notes: The table is the absolute value of the agent’s expected utility difference in the pair of action




Table 3.12: Principal’s Net Expected Utility from Separation: the Large-Human-Capital-Payoff 
Case.   Notes: The net expected utility from separation under the large-human-capital-payoff case is 
derived by subtracting the result in Table 3.9 by Table 3.10. Each cell corresponds to the maximum for 
a pair of action plans. 
↵↵↵;↵↵  2.793 ↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 1.811   ↵;  ↵ 2.236 ↵  ;  ↵ 3.432 ↵  ;  ↵ 2.475
↵↵↵;↵↵  1.931 ↵↵ ;↵   3.049   ↵;    3.364 ↵  ;    3.131 ↵  ;    2.173
↵↵↵;    3.520 ↵↵ ;↵   2.747   ↵;    3.222 ↵  ;    3.260 ↵  ;    2.302
↵↵↵;  ↵ 3.245 ↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 1.795   ↵; ↵ 2.220 ↵  ; ↵ 2.723 ↵  ; ↵ 2.565
↵↵↵;    3.073 ↵↵ ;↵   3.033   ↵;   3.348 ↵  ;   3.220 ↵  ;   2.263
↵↵↵;↵ ↵ 2.825 ↵↵ ;↵   2.651   ↵;   3.194 ↵  ;   2.263 ↵  ;   2.105
↵↵↵;↵   2.623 ↵↵ ; ↵↵ 3.028    ;↵ ↵ 3.288 ↵  ;↵ ↵ 1.515  ↵↵; ↵  3.323
↵↵↵;↵   1.761 ↵↵ ; ↵  2.727    ;↵   2.829 ↵  ;↵   2.643  ↵↵; ↵  3.115
↵↵↵;↵ ↵ 2.729 ↵↵ ; ↵  2.519    ;↵   2.621 ↵  ;↵   2.421  ↵↵;  ↵ 3.557
↵↵↵;↵   2.527 ↵↵ ;  ↵ 2.961    ;↵ ↵ 3.159 ↵  ; ↵↵ 2.638  ↵↵;    3.255
↵↵↵;↵   1.665 ↵↵ ;    2.659    ;↵   2.700 ↵  ; ↵  2.337  ↵↵;    3.384
↵↵↵; ↵↵ 2.802 ↵↵ ;    2.788    ;↵   2.828 ↵  ; ↵  2.128  ↵↵; ↵ 2.647
↵↵↵; ↵  3.076 ↵↵ ; ↵ 2.811    ; ↵↵ 3.079 ↵  ;  ↵ 2.570  ↵↵;   3.145
↵↵↵; ↵  2.966 ↵↵ ;   2.749    ; ↵  2.789 ↵  ;    2.269  ↵↵;   2.187
↵↵↵;  ↵ 2.735 ↵↵ ;   2.351    ; ↵  2.619 ↵  ;    2.398  ↵ ; ↵  3.231
↵↵↵;    3.009    ;  ↵ 3.608    ;  ↵ 2.392 ↵  ; ↵ 2.581  ↵ ;  ↵ 3.194
↵↵↵;    2.562    ;    3.277    ;    1.531 ↵  ;   2.358  ↵ ;    3.372
↵↵↵; ↵ 1.825    ;↵ ↵ 2.398    ;    2.499 ↵  ;   2.121  ↵ ;    2.925
↵↵↵;   2.323    ;↵   3.526    ; ↵ 2.297 ↵ ↵;↵   2.281  ↵ ; ↵ 2.188
↵↵↵;   1.365    ;↵   3.384    ;   1.435 ↵ ↵;↵   1.419  ↵ ;   2.685
↵↵ ;↵↵  2.444    ;↵ ↵ 2.383    ;   2.572 ↵ ↵; ↵↵ 2.556  ↵ ;   1.728
↵↵ ;    3.807    ;↵   3.510 ↵ ↵;↵   2.846 ↵ ↵; ↵  2.830  ↵ ;  ↵ 2.986
↵↵ ;  ↵ 4.109    ;↵   3.351 ↵ ↵;↵   2.736 ↵ ↵; ↵  2.720  ↵ ;    3.164
↵↵ ;    3.936    ; ↵↵ 3.451 ↵ ↵;↵ ↵ 2.504 ↵ ↵;  ↵ 2.489  ↵ ;    2.716
↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 2.673    ; ↵  2.991 ↵ ↵;↵   2.779 ↵ ↵;    2.763  ↵ ; ↵ 1.979
↵↵ ;↵   3.750    ; ↵  2.783 ↵ ↵;↵   2.332 ↵ ↵;    2.316  ↵ ;   2.477
↵↵ ;↵   2.889    ;  ↵ 3.322 ↵ ↵; ↵↵ 1.595 ↵ ↵; ↵ 1.579  ↵ ;   1.519
↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 2.657    ;    2.862 ↵ ↵; ↵  2.092 ↵ ↵;   2.077   ↵;    3.126
↵↵ ;↵   3.655    ;    2.991 ↵ ↵; ↵  1.135 ↵ ↵;   1.119   ↵;    3.255
↵↵ ;↵   2.793    ; ↵ 3.236 ↵ ↵;  ↵ 2.658 ↵  ;↵   2.547   ↵; ↵ 2.518
↵↵ ; ↵↵ 3.890    ;   2.951 ↵ ↵;    2.377 ↵  ; ↵↵ 3.404   ↵;   3.016
↵↵ ; ↵  3.589    ;   2.011 ↵ ↵;    3.424 ↵  ; ↵  3.103   ↵;   2.058
↵↵ ; ↵  3.381   ↵;    3.446 ↵ ↵; ↵ 2.563 ↵  ; ↵  2.895    ;    2.591
↵↵ ;  ↵ 3.823   ↵;↵ ↵ 2.409 ↵ ↵;   3.500 ↵  ;  ↵ 3.337    ; ↵ 2.838
↵↵ ;    3.521   ↵;↵   3.537 ↵ ↵;   3.198 ↵  ;    3.035    ;   2.552
↵↵ ;    3.650   ↵;↵   3.395 ↵  ;↵   2.990 ↵  ;    3.164    ;   2.378
↵↵ ; ↵ 2.953   ↵;↵ ↵ 2.393 ↵  ;↵ ↵ 3.432 ↵  ; ↵ 2.707    ; ↵ 2.682
↵↵ ;   3.450   ↵;↵   3.521 ↵  ;↵   3.131 ↵  ;   3.124    ;   2.390
↵↵ ;   2.493   ↵;↵   3.367 ↵  ;↵   3.260 ↵  ;   2.247    ;   2.222
↵↵ ;    2.946   ↵; ↵↵ 3.461 ↵  ; ↵↵ 2.723 ↵  ; ↵↵ 2.542  ↵;   2.160
↵↵ ;  ↵ 3.247   ↵; ↵  3.098 ↵  ; ↵  3.220 ↵  ; ↵  2.241  ↵;   1.978
↵↵ ;    3.074   ↵; ↵  2.890 ↵  ; ↵  2.263 ↵  ; ↵  2.033   ;   1.688
Table 3.12: Principal’s Net Expected Utility from Separation: the Large-Human-Capital-Payoff
Case
Notes: The net expected utility from separation under the large-human-capital-payoff case is derived
by subtracting the result in Table 3.9 by Table 3.10. Each cell corresponds to the maximum for a




Table 3.13: Principal’s Net Expected Utility from Separation: the Small-Human-Capital-Payoff 
Case.   Notes: The table is the principal’s net expected utility of separation under the small-human-
capital-payoff case, which is derived by subtracting the result in Table 3.10 by Table 3.11. Each cell 
corresponds to the maximum for a pair of action plans. 
↵↵↵;↵↵  3.506 ↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 2.801   ↵;  ↵ 3.825 ↵  ;  ↵ 3.531 ↵  ;  ↵ 2.970
↵↵↵;↵↵  3.000 ↵↵ ;↵   3.326   ↵;    3.811 ↵  ;    3.515 ↵  ;    2.953
↵↵↵;    3.817 ↵↵ ;↵   2.826   ↵;    3.652 ↵  ;    3.359 ↵  ;    2.797
↵↵↵;  ↵ 3.827 ↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 2.745   ↵; ↵ 3.410 ↵  ; ↵ 3.119 ↵  ; ↵ 2.565
↵↵↵;    3.654 ↵↵ ;↵   3.270   ↵;   3.512 ↵  ;   3.220 ↵  ;   2.659
↵↵↵;↵ ↵ 2.904 ↵↵ ;↵   2.770   ↵;   2.950 ↵  ;   2.659 ↵  ;   2.105
↵↵↵;↵   3.415 ↵↵ ; ↵↵ 3.404    ;↵ ↵ 3.345 ↵  ;↵ ↵ 2.544  ↵↵; ↵  3.608
↵↵↵;↵   2.909 ↵↵ ; ↵  3.388    ;↵   3.756 ↵  ;↵   2.959  ↵↵; ↵  3.448
↵↵↵;↵ ↵ 2.848 ↵↵ ; ↵  3.228    ;↵   3.250 ↵  ;↵   2.460  ↵↵;  ↵ 3.557
↵↵↵;↵   3.358 ↵↵ ;  ↵ 3.337    ;↵ ↵ 3.290 ↵  ; ↵↵ 3.093  ↵↵;    3.540
↵↵↵;↵   2.853 ↵↵ ;    3.321    ;↵   3.700 ↵  ; ↵  3.077  ↵↵;    3.384
↵↵↵; ↵↵ 3.495 ↵↵ ;    3.164    ;↵   3.194 ↵  ; ↵  2.917  ↵↵; ↵ 3.142
↵↵↵; ↵  3.484 ↵↵ ; ↵ 2.930    ; ↵↵ 3.781 ↵  ;  ↵ 3.026  ↵↵;   3.244
↵↵↵; ↵  3.326 ↵↵ ;   3.026    ; ↵  3.609 ↵  ;    3.010  ↵↵;   2.682
↵↵↵;  ↵ 3.428 ↵↵ ;   2.470    ; ↵  3.449 ↵  ;    2.853  ↵ ; ↵  3.279
↵↵↵;    3.417    ;  ↵ 4.208    ;  ↵ 3.652 ↵  ; ↵ 2.620  ↵ ;  ↵ 3.479
↵↵↵;    3.255    ;    3.877    ;    3.480 ↵  ;   2.715  ↵ ;    3.372
↵↵↵; ↵ 3.013    ;↵ ↵ 3.507    ;    3.321 ↵  ;   2.160  ↵ ;    3.209
↵↵↵;   3.115    ;↵   3.912    ; ↵ 3.079 ↵ ↵;↵   2.994  ↵ ; ↵ 2.967
↵↵↵;   2.553    ;↵   3.407    ;   3.181 ↵ ↵;↵   2.488  ↵ ;   3.069
↵↵ ;↵↵  2.800    ;↵ ↵ 3.452    ;   2.619 ↵ ↵; ↵↵ 3.130  ↵ ;   2.507
↵↵ ;    4.223    ;↵   3.856 ↵ ↵;↵   3.105 ↵ ↵; ↵  3.120  ↵ ;  ↵ 3.319
↵↵ ;  ↵ 4.240    ;↵   3.351 ↵ ↵;↵   2.600 ↵ ↵; ↵  2.961  ↵ ;    3.212
↵↵ ;    4.067    ; ↵↵ 3.938 ↵ ↵;↵ ↵ 2.538 ↵ ↵;  ↵ 3.063  ↵ ;    3.050
↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 3.306    ; ↵  3.769 ↵ ↵;↵   3.049 ↵ ↵;    3.052  ↵ ; ↵ 2.808
↵↵ ;↵   3.830    ; ↵  3.610 ↵ ↵;↵   2.544 ↵ ↵;    2.890  ↵ ;   2.909
↵↵ ;↵   3.324    ;  ↵ 3.809 ↵ ↵; ↵↵ 3.186 ↵ ↵; ↵ 2.648  ↵ ;   2.348
↵↵ ;↵ ↵ 3.251    ;    3.640 ↵ ↵; ↵  3.175 ↵ ↵;   2.750   ↵;    3.411
↵↵ ;↵   3.773    ;    3.478 ↵ ↵; ↵  3.016 ↵ ↵;   2.188   ↵;    3.255
↵↵ ;↵   3.268    ; ↵ 3.236 ↵ ↵;  ↵ 3.118 ↵  ;↵   2.903   ↵; ↵ 3.013
↵↵ ; ↵↵ 3.910    ;   3.337 ↵ ↵;    3.108 ↵  ; ↵↵ 3.542   ↵;   3.115
↵↵ ; ↵  3.893    ;   2.011 ↵ ↵;    2.946 ↵  ; ↵  3.526   ↵;   2.553
↵↵ ; ↵  3.734   ↵;    4.052 ↵ ↵; ↵ 2.704 ↵  ; ↵  3.366    ;    3.080
↵↵ ;  ↵ 3.842   ↵;↵ ↵ 3.518 ↵ ↵;   2.805 ↵  ;  ↵ 3.475    ; ↵ 2.838
↵↵ ;    3.826   ↵;↵   3.928 ↵ ↵;   2.244 ↵  ;    3.459    ;   2.940
↵↵ ;    3.670   ↵;↵   3.423 ↵  ;↵   3.015 ↵  ;    3.302    ;   2.378
↵↵ ; ↵ 3.428   ↵;↵ ↵ 3.462 ↵  ;↵ ↵ 3.050 ↵  ; ↵ 3.063    ; ↵ 2.682
↵↵ ;   3.530   ↵;↵   3.872 ↵  ;↵   3.464 ↵  ;   3.164    ;   2.784
↵↵ ;   2.968   ↵;↵   3.367 ↵  ;↵   2.959 ↵  ;   2.603    ;   2.222
↵↵ ;    3.718   ↵; ↵↵ 3.954 ↵  ; ↵↵ 3.599 ↵  ; ↵↵ 3.037  ↵;   2.540
↵↵ ;  ↵ 3.734   ↵; ↵  3.878 ↵  ; ↵  3.582 ↵  ; ↵  3.021  ↵;   1.978
↵↵ ;    3.561   ↵; ↵  3.718 ↵  ; ↵  3.423 ↵  ; ↵  2.861   ;   2.048
Table 3.13: Principal’s Net Expected Utility from Separation: the Small-Human-Capital-Payoff
Case
Notes: The table is the principal’s net expected utility of separation under the small-human-capital-
payoff case, which is derived by subtracting the result in Table 3.10 by Table 3.11. Each cell
corresponds to the maximum for a pair of action plans.
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